Pluralism: A Principle for Children\u27s Rights by Lau, Holning S.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2007
Pluralism: A Principle for Children's Rights
Holning S. Lau
University of North Carolina School of Law, hslau@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights 
 
Holning Lau∗ 
Some day, maybe, there will exist a well-informed, well-consid-
ered and yet fervent public conviction that the most deadly of 
all possible sins is the mutilation of a child’s spirit. 
                   —Erik H. Erikson1 
There has been a proliferation of scholarship on the harms caused by 
pressures to assimilate2—for example, pressures on Muslims not to wear 
their traditional garb, pressures on businesswomen to downplay their moth-
erhood, and pressures on same-sex couples not to display affection pub-
licly. Legal scholars have argued that assimilation demands strike a blow 
to a person’s sense of identity,3 imposing unjustiªed psychological bur-
dens.4 Kenji Yoshino has gone so far as to suggest a new civil rights move-
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1
 Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History 
70 (1958). 
2
 See Nathan Glazer, Is Assimilation Dead?, 530 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 
122, 123 (1993) (describing the growing consensus among scholars that “assimilation . . . 
is somewhat disreputable, opposed to the reality of both individual and group difference 
and to the claims that such differences should be recognized and celebrated”). 
3
 Drawing from psychological literature, I deªne identity as the sense of self that indi-
viduals develop by committing to values and goals associated with particular social catego-
ries. Identity must be developed. Thus, for example, an individual of Chinese American 
ancestry does not develop a Chinese American identity unless she adopts values and goals 
associated with the Chinese American community. Others may label her as Chinese Ameri-
can based on her genes, but she does not possess a Chinese American identity in the psy-
chological sense if she feels no allegiance to Chinese American values and goals.  
4
 See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, A New Type of Discrimination: The Prohibition Era, New 
Republic, Mar. 20, 2006, at 22: 
[A demand] for assimilation to majority norms . . . is profoundly unfair, burden-
ing minorities in ways that majorities are not burdened. Moreover, the demand is 
fraught with psychological danger. How can a person really have equality when 
she has to push some of her most deeply rooted commitments under the rug, treat-
ing them as something shameful and socially inappropriate? 
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ment that focuses on protecting a person’s right not to assimilate and to 
live a life that is centered on an “uncovered,” authentic identity.5 
The existing legal scholarship on identity and assimilation focuses 
on adults. In this Article, I bring the discussion full circle, back to where the 
concept of identity ªrst arose—the context of childhood. The concept of 
identity was not commonly used until the 1950s, when psychologist Erik 
H. Erikson introduced the terms “identity” and “identity crisis” in his 
works on children.6 
Consider Kenji Yoshino’s works on assimilation, in which he argues 
that it is troubling when an employer requires her gay (adult) employees to 
hide their same-sex relationships, demanding that employees assimilate 
to a heterosexual norm.7 What happens when we shift the focus from the 
ofªce to the schoolhouse? Is it equally, less, or more troubling when a pub-
lic high school punishes students who openly display same-sex affection 
and threatens to out those students to their parents?8 This Article contends 
that cases involving children are more troubling than cases involving adults 
and that the law should account for that fact. The developmental state of 
childhood renders children particularly vulnerable to the harmful effects 
of assimilation demands. 
 
                                                                                                                             
Throughout this Article, I focus on the harmful effects of demands to assimilate and not on 
assimilation itself, which may be uncoerced. For examples of legal scholarship on these 
demands, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance 
Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2541, 2562–65 
(1994) (discussing costs associated with gender-based assimilation); Devon W. Carbado & 
Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259, 1279–93 (2000) (discussing 
costs associated with race-based assimilation) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working 
Identity]. 
5
 Kenji Yoshino, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights 27, 184–
96 (2006). Borrowing from sociologist Erving Goffman, Yoshino uses the term “covering” 
to refer to the “ton[ing] down” of particular identity traits to ªt into the mainstream. Id. at 
ix. 
6
 See Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (1950); Erik H. Erikson, Identity 
and the Life Cycle (W. W. Norton & Co. 1980) (1959) [hereinafter Erikson, Life Cy-
cle]; Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth, and Crisis (1968) [hereinafter Erikson, Youth 
and Crisis]; Erik H. Erikson, Youth: Change and Challenge (1963); see also Glazer, 
supra note 2, at 124–25 (acknowledging that the concept of identity was introduced by 
Erikson through his works on children); Ruben G. Rumbaut, The Crucible Within: Ethnic 
Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants, 28 
Int’l Migration Rev. 748, 753 (1994) (same). 
7
 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 69–70 (criticizing the federal government’s “Don’t 
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy for requiring gay service members to hide their sexual orientation); 
id. at 93–101 (criticizing Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), in which the 
court upheld the government’s withdrawal of an employment offer from a lesbian because 
she ºaunted her same-sex relationship). 
8
 This question is inspired by the pending case of C.N. v. Wolf, in which a high school 
disciplined a lesbian student for being affectionate with her girlfriend and outed the stu-
dent to her parents, even though the school allegedly never punished opposite-sex couples 
for similar conduct. 410 F. Supp. 2d 894 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (granting in part and denying in 
part defendants’ motion to dismiss); see also Seema Mehta, Lesbian Student Files Discrimina-
tion Lawsuit, L.A. Times, Sept. 8, 2005, at B3.  
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Public policies often require children to conform to majoritarian 
community standards.9 Of course, requiring children to conform may some-
times be desirable and not harmful. Children need to learn and adopt some 
basic social norms in order to grow into well-functioning members of soci-
ety.10 Socialization of children can be as innocuous as requiring school-
children to raise their hands before speaking and to wait patiently in line 
in the cafeteria. However, socialization processes become harmful when 
they require children to suppress their identities.11 For example, forbid-
ding girls to wear headscarves in school psychologically burdens many 
Muslim schoolgirls, for whom headscarves are an identity trait.12 
The remainder of this Article contains three arguments: a normative 
policy argument in Parts I and II, a descriptive legal argument in Part III, 
and a prescriptive legal argument in Part IV. In Part I, I argue that chil-
dren are harmed when they are pressured to suppress traits of minority so-
cial groups in order to ªt into the mainstream.13 Allegiance to a minority 
group informs an individual’s identity.14 Accordingly, suppression of mi-
 
                                                                                                                             
9
 See Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conºict, and the Socialization of Children, 91 
Cal. L. Rev. 967 (2003); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 Harv. Educ. Rev. 
487, 490 (1973).  
10
 See Nussbaum, supra note 4, at 26. 
11
 As discussed infra in Part I, the suppression of identity generates particular psycho-
logical burdens. 
12
 In 2004, France banned the wearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols, including 
headscarves, in public schools. See Law No. 2004-22 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Ofªciel de 
la République Française [J.O.] [Ofªcial Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. For 
commentary on the law’s psychological impact on Muslim girls, see Adrien Katherine 
Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, 
France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 743, 777–83 (2006). 
Recall that the term “identity” refers to the sense of self that individuals develop by 
committing to values and goals associated with particular social categories. Accordingly, I 
use the term “identity trait” as a shorthand (that is not part of psychology jargon) to refer 
to traits that have special value or represent particular goals to people within an identity 
group. Headscarves may seem like ordinary pieces of clothing to many people; however, 
they are an identity trait for Muslims who place special value on headscarves. 
13
 In this Article, I focus on minority social groups based on race, ethnicity, religion, 
political opinion, disability, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Traditionally, prejudice 
has been based on these statuses, rendering them particularly relevant to a person’s self-
awareness. Although trait suppression manifests differently across these statuses, a common 
denominator is that coerced suppression of these statuses burdens children psychologically.  
For a discussion addressing the question of slippery slopes, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 137–141. For example, can shy students constitute a minority social group and, 
therefore, oppose all public speaking assignments? I answer in the negative and explain 
that such slippery-slope concerns are unwarranted. 
14
  
[O]rdinary discourse differentiates people according to social groups such as women 
and men, age groups, racial and ethnic groups, religious groups, and so on. Social 
groups of this sort are not simply collections of people, for they are more funda-
mentally intertwined with the identities of the people described as belonging to 
them. 
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference 42–43 (1990); see Linda 
R. Tropp & Stephen C. Wright, Ingroup Identiªcation as the Inclusion of Ingroup in the 
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nority traits undermines that identity, exacting a psychological toll. The 
law should endeavor to prevent such psychological burdens.15 
That goal can be realized through pluralism, the making of space for 
difference.16 Thus, in Part II, I propose a two-pronged pluralism principle 
for children’s rights jurisprudence.17 The ªrst prong dictates that, while 
socialization of children is generally acceptable, the state must avoid so-
cialization policies that undermine a child’s ability to develop and express 
her identity (which I refer to as “identity interests”). However, according 
to the second prong, the state can restrict a child’s exercise of identity inter-
ests if protecting that exercise would cause cognizable harms to the child 
or to others.18 
 
                                                                                                                             
Self, 27 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 585, 585–86 (2001) (surveying psychologi-
cal literature that acknowledges that “the self is construed in relation to one’s group mem-
berships”).  
Group status is particularly relevant to individuals’ sense of self when the group is an 
oppressed minority group. See Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d. 1166, 1183 
n.28 (9th Cir. 2006): 
There is, of course, a difference between a historically oppressed minority group 
that has been the victim of serious prejudice and discrimination and a group that 
has always enjoyed a preferred social, economic and political status. Growing up 
as a member of a minority group often carries with it psychological and emotional 
burdens not incurred by members of the majority. 
See also Margaret E. Montoya, Máscaras, Trenzas, y Greñas: Un/Masking the Self While 
Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Stories, 15 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 1, 13–15 (1994) 
(arguing that the suppression of minority traits is a particularly harmful form of confor-
mity); Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007) 
(on ªle with author) (same).  
15
 I do not suggest that the law should prevent all psychological burdens on children. 
For example, even though a child may experience stress from having a favorite television 
show canceled, I do not argue that the law should intervene. Accepting respected commen-
tators’ existing arguments that the law should prevent the particular psychological harms of 
assimilation demands, this Article simply contends that those commentators’ main points 
are especially pressing for children; the Article does not make broad arguments about gen-
eral psychological burdens. 
16
 Although commentators often write about speciªc forms of pluralism (e.g., political 
pluralism, cultural pluralism, religious pluralism), I use the term pluralism to refer to the 
making of space for difference within identity categories generally. 
17
 The pluralism principle builds on Emily Buss’s developmentalist approach to chil-
dren’s rights, which asserts that in deciding what autonomy rights to extend to children, 
the government should consider the developmental beneªts and harms of such extensions. 
See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child, and the State, 
2004 U. Chi. Legal F. 27, 35 [hereinafter Buss, Allocating Developmental Control]. 
18
 In Part II.B, infra, I deªne cognizable harms to include only a narrow range of con-
sequences. Indeed, harms cognizable under the pluralism principle are not synonymous 
with harms in common parlance. 
This prong is partly inspired by John Stuart Mill’s time-honored harm principle. See 
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (John Gray ed., 1998). The plural-
ism principle clearly differs from Mill’s harm principle because Mill explicitly excluded 
children from his principle’s coverage. See id. at 14. Also, whereas Mill only was con-
cerned with harms to others, the pluralism principle is concerned with children’s harms to 
themselves as well. See Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self: The Moral Limits of the 
Criminal Law 69, 325–33 (1984).  
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In Part III, I show that the pluralism principle is already emerging in 
jurisprudence on children’s constitutional rights, even though courts and 
commentators have never clearly articulated the principle.19 Critics charge 
that the Supreme Court’s children’s rights jurisprudence lacks coherence.20 
However, the Court’s decisions are not inconsistent when viewed in light 
of the pluralism principle. The principle helps to explain why the Court has 
recognized children’s rights in some instances and refused to do so in others. 
Explicitly acknowledging the pluralism principle would reconcile the seem-
ingly inconsistent decisions while at the same time realizing the policy 
goal of protecting children’s identity interests. 
In Part IV, I present a case study on issues concerning gay and les-
bian youth to illustrate how the pluralism principle should inºuence de-
veloping law.21 Questions regarding gay and lesbian youth have elicited 
much attention. Lower courts have provided inconsistent answers to these 
questions due to divergent interpretations of the Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence on children’s rights. That divergence stems from a failure to see 
and implement the pluralism principle. 
Do gay and lesbian youth have a right to display romantic affection 
at school and to organize gay pride events at school?22 Can a public school 
protect gay and lesbian youth from hate speech without violating the Consti-
tution?23 Do gay and lesbian youth have a right to privacy that includes a 
 
                                                                                                                             
19
 Note that my current project focuses on children’s constitutional rights. Thus, it only 
addresses children’s claims against the state. It does not address children’s claims against 
their parents, nor does it cover parents’ claims against the state. I do address, however, how 
parental interests might inºuence children’s claims against the state. See infra Part II.C.2.i. 
20
 See Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 12 (2005) 
(“[T]he children’s rights movement has been a confused and often ridiculed one . . . . Nearly 
forty years after the movement began, it has made very little progress developing a cogent 
conceptual position.”); Nancy E. Walker, Children’s Rights in the United States 10 
(1999) (“[C]ourts have answered [the question of children’s rights] in inconsistent ways. 
Certain pronouncements make the rights of children explicit, but other U.S. Supreme Court 
opinions reºect a paternalistic view.”); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s 
Rights?, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 267–77 (1995) (“The Court’s ambivalence swings between two 
starkly contrasting alternatives. One would extend adult rights to children; the other would 
treat children in important ways as subject to different authorities.”) [hereinafter Minow, 
Children’s Rights]; Rodham, supra note 9, at 487 (“The phrase ‘children’s rights’ is a slo-
gan in search of deªnition.”); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Children’s Rights and the Problem of 
Equal Respect, 27 Hofstra L. Rev. 799, 799 (1999) (“Few areas present more difªcult 
problems than does the deªnition of the rights of children.”).  
21
 Sexual orientation issues make for an illustrative case study because gays and lesbi-
ans are subject to a uniquely wide variety of assimilation demands. See Kenji Yoshino, 
Covering, 111 Yale L.J. 769, 772 (2002).  
22
 Lower courts have issued disparate interpretations of the Supreme Court’s case law 
on student expression. One court has held that bringing a same-sex partner to a high school 
prom is protected speech. See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980). Other 
courts maintain that school ofªcials have broad discretion to censor student expression. 
See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 471 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that school ofªcials may prohibit a student from wearing a T-shirt with “illustrations of 
[the musician] Marilyn Manson largely unadorned by text” because Manson “promotes 
disruptive and demoralizing values”). 
23
 Compare Harper v. Poway Uniªed Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006) 
322 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 42 
right not to be outed by school ofªcials?24 The pluralism principle offers 
a normatively desirable, uniªed approach to these questions. 
In the Conclusion, I take a cursory look at how the pluralism princi-
ple should inºuence laws affecting children who identify with other mi-
nority groups, such as religious and ethnic groups.25 In doing so, I invite 
discussion on how the law should remedy assimilation-based wounds suf-
fered by children. 
I. Assimilation Demands and Their Effects on Children 
How do the harms of coerced assimilation speciªcally affect children? 
Assimilation demands are disproportionately harmful to children because 
children lack the emotional maturity that helps adults cope with psycho-
logical burdens.26 Older children are often the most vulnerable to assimi-
lation harms. Not only do adolescents27 generally have less coping capac-
ity than adults, but they are also at the stage of development in which 
people are most preoccupied with identity issues.28 Combining those two 
factors, adolescents not only are less capable of weathering the storms of 
assimilation demands, but also are situated in a storm zone. 
In this Part, I ªrst present existing legal scholarship on assimilation’s 
harms. Then, I relate that scholarship to social science literature on chil-
dren’s coping capacity and identity development. 
 
                                                                                                                             
(holding that a public school did not violate the First Amendment by prohibiting a student 
from wearing a T-shirt that condemned homosexuality), with Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (reaching the opposite conclusion in a 
case with nearly identical facts), and Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that a public school violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments by refusing to allow individuals who would condemn homosexuality from partici-
pating in a panel discussion). Some courts have held that schools’ antiharassment policies 
violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 
(3d Cir. 2001); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1993).  
24
 A student is asserting this controversial privacy claim in the pending case of C.N. v. 
Wolf. See Mehta, supra note 8. 
25
 These groups are not mutually exclusive, of course.  
26
 See infra Part I.B.1. 
27
 I use the term “adolescents” to refer to a subset of “children,” as opposed to an en-
tirely distinct category, because the law has traditionally done so. For example, in Bellotti 
v. Baird, the Court addressed the rights of pregnant teenagers, yet referred to those teenag-
ers’ rights as “children’s rights.” See, e.g., 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). Similarly, the interna-
tional human rights community treats adolescents as a subset of children. See United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448 (“For the 
purpose of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eight-
een years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”) But see 
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 549 
(2000) (arguing for recognition of adolescence as a distinct legal category). 
28
 See infra notes 75, 78–83 and accompanying text. 
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A. Assimilation’s Flaws 
1. History 
Assimilation has long played a prominent role in American society. 
In the context of immigration, the “melting pot” ideal went largely un-
challenged until recently.29 According to this romantic metaphor, Ameri-
cans of diverse ancestral backgrounds would “melt” into a uniªed blend of 
American identity.30 
Progressives of the early twentieth century believed that the uniªed 
blend of American identity would constantly change over time, absorbing 
new characteristics from immigrants as they melted into the blend.31 As dis-
cussed below, however, assimilation has not lived up to this metaphor. 
The demands of assimilation usually require immigrants and other minority 
groups to abandon, rather than contribute, traits that they value to melt 
into the existing American mainstream. Indeed, the term “assimilation” now 
generally refers to the process by which minority groups abandon, hide, 
or downplay their identity traits in an attempt to ªt into the mainstream.32 
Even if minorities do contribute some of their characteristics to a 
uniªed American identity,33 the melting pot ideal is nonetheless troubling 
because blending identities still requires people to abandon, hide, or down-
play some, though perhaps not all, of the identity traits that they value.34 
Accordingly, many commentators have discarded the melting pot imagery, 
embracing other metaphors such as salad bowls and mosaics, in which 
individual ingredients of the salad or individual pieces of the mosaic re-
 
                                                                                                                             
29
 The term “melting pot” derives from the play The Melting-Pot by Israel Zangwill, 
ªrst performed in 1908. See Israel Zangwill, The Melting-Pot (1909). Kenji Yoshino 
asserts that criticisms against the melting pot grew out of the civil rights movement of the 
1960s. See Yoshino, supra note 5, at xi. Camille Gear Rich believes that it was not until 
the 1990s that most Americans abandoned the melting pot ideal. See Camille Gear Rich, 
Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title 
VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1134, 1234 (2004). Even today, however, some political ªgures, such 
as Pat Buchanan, openly idealize the melting pot despite the criticism against it. See, e.g., 
Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Con-
quest of America (2006). 
30
 For background on the melting pot, see Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of 




 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) 
deªnes assimilation as “[t]he process whereby a minority group gradually adopts the cus-
toms and attitudes of the prevailing culture.” Kenji Yoshino describes three forms of as-
similation: conversion (i.e., abandoning traits), passing (i.e., hiding traits), and covering (i.e., 
downplaying traits). See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 17–18. 
33
 Mainstreaming of minority culture does occur to some degree. Cf. Howard Wi-
nant, Racial Conditions 26 (2002) (discussing the inºuence that blacks have had on 
mainstream American music). 
34
 In Part I.A.3, infra, I recognize that pressuring people to relinquish personal traits 
they value is not troubling under exceptional circumstances, for example, when exercising 
a behavioral trait harms others. 
324 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 42 
tain their original characteristics while contributing to the overall ºavor 
or picture.35 
2. Harmful Effects 
Legal commentators have identiªed both macro and micro levels of 
harm associated with assimilation demands. At the macro level, pressures 
to assimilate are harmful because they reinforce social dynamics that 
subordinate traditionally disadvantaged groups. For example, the pressure 
on racial and ethnic minorities to “act white” reinforces white suprem-
acy.36 When an employer bans traditionally black hairstyles from the work-
place, she is demanding conformity with a white standard of beauty, which 
mainstream society assumes to be superior.37 By maintaining her groom-
ing code, the employer reinforces that notion of white superiority.38 
Similarly, pressures on Muslim women to remove their veils, and on 
Jewish men to remove their yarmulkes, reinforce notions of Christian su-
premacy.39 The pressure on businesswomen to hide their childcare responsi-
bilities reinforces patriarchy.40 And the pressure on gays and lesbians to 
downplay their romantic relationships in public reinforces heterosexism.41 In 
these ways, pressures to assimilate reinforce oppressive social norms. 
At the micro level, assimilation demands take their toll on individu-
als by imposing psychological costs. According to psychologists, a healthy 
identity requires congruence between one’s inner sense of self and one’s 
outward representations of that self.42 Assimilation demands can undermine 
that congruence, creating a psychological burden.43 
 
                                                                                                                             
35
 See John Rhee, Theories of Citizenship and Their Role in the Bilingual Education 
Debate, 33 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 33, 37 n.20 (1999); Rich, supra note 29, at 1234.  
36
 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 132–36. 
37
 See Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding 
an employer’s restriction on braided hairstyles against a Title VII challenge, even though 
an employee argued that her hairstyle was an expression of black identity). According to 
Paulette M. Caldwell: 
[B]lack women who are permitted to break through the barrier of racial exclusion 
into “visible” jobs involving public contact are likely to be those who possess physi-
cal characteristics close to those of women of the dominant racial group . . . . 
Rather than focusing on the black woman herself, the impetus to exclude is trans-
ferred to the black woman’s hair. 
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 
1991 Duke L.J. 365, 391 (1991). 
38
 See Caldwell, supra note 37, at 391. 
39
 See Yoshino, supra note 5, at 169–70. 
40
 See id. at 142–66, 177. 
41
 See id. at 93–101. 
42
 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
43
 See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. While an individual subjected to as-
similation demands bears a psychological burden, she might also “export” some of that 
burden to her family. See Zachary Kramer, After Work: Family Harms in Employment Dis-
crimination Law, 95 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007). 
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Consider, for example, that some employers pressure their black em-
ployees to suppress traits that the employees value as racial traits.44 Laki-
sha,45 who once regularly wore cornrows and kente scarves, may submit 
to that pressure and adopt the name Mary, straighten her hair with synthetic 
chemicals, and abandon her kente scarves.46 In doing so, Lakisha, now Mary, 
dons a mask. Lakisha’s expressed self, her mask, is no longer congruent 
with her inner sense of self; this incongruity inºicts a psychological wound. 
Employers’ assimilation demands suggest to Lakisha that black identity 
is inferior and unworthy of respect.47 For Lakisha, who identiªes with black 
culture despite her mask, that suggestion of inferiority demeans her inner 
sense of self and can produce self-hatred.48 
Under statutory employment law, employers may not refuse to hire 
Lakisha simply because she is of African descent, but they generally may 
refuse to hire her for openly expressing black identity.49 Lakisha is left 
with a harrowing decision: sacriªce ªnancial livelihood or assimilate and 
betray her sense of self.50 Excoriating this tradeoff between dignity and 
ªnancial health, commentators have argued for statutory reform,51 rein-
 
                                                                                                                             
44
 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. Contemp. Le-
gal Issues 701 (2001) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Fifth Black Woman]; Carbado & 
Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1279–93. 
45
 Economists Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found that having a name 
associated with African American culture, such as “Lakisha” or “Jamal,” signiªcantly re-
duces one’s likelihood of receiving a job interview. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mul-
lainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Ex-
periment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Pa-
per No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873. 
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woman” hypothetical. See Carbado & Gulati, Fifth Black Woman, supra note 44, at 710–
21. 
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derive from white supremacy). 
48
 See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1277 (describing assimila-
tion processes as “self-negating” and “self-denying”); Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and 
Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Contemporary Inºuences, 92 Mich. L. 
Rev. 2370, 2408 (1994) (“To be forced to suppress one’s cultural identity . . . is insulting 
and demeaning.”); Montoya, supra note 14, at 13 (“[Wearing] masks of acculturation can 
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49
 See Rich, supra note 29, at 1137 (“[I]t has long been established that Title VII does 
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identity.”).  
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 Even by betraying her sense of self, Lakisha suffers an economic burden. Commen-
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tures. See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 4, at 1279 & n.43. 
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 See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 805, 809 (1994) (proposing an 
expansion of Title VII to protect expressions of ethnicity). 
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terpretation of existing statutes,52 and extralegal remedies such as greater 
public discourse on assimilation’s harms.53 
3. Circumscribing the Criticism 
Before proceeding to a discussion of assimilation in childhood con-
texts, I should clarify that criticism of pressures to conform is not absolute. 
The criticism should be circumscribed for three main reasons. First, not 
all socialization demands produce psychological harms. For example, there 
is innocuous social pressure to conform to unwritten codes of politeness—to 
say “thank you,” to hold the door for others, and to offer one’s bus seat to 
the elderly. Generally speaking, one would be hard-pressed to argue that 
such conformity compromises anyone’s identity.54 Moreover, pressure to 
conform is less offensive when it manifests in the form of encourage-
ment. The pressure is most harmful when it is a coercive demand. For 
example, it is one thing for the state to encourage patriotism with a reci-
tation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools; it is quite another thing to 
coerce patriotism by suspending students who refuse to participate in the 
salute.55 
Second, even when assimilation demands undermine individuals’ iden-
tity, those demands may be justiªed. For example, a man may identify 
with a particular ethnic group that traditionally condones wife battering. 
Assimilating to social norms against domestic violence may contradict that 
man’s identity; however, the state can justify requiring that man to con-
form to social norms against domestic violence because wife beating cre-
ates both physical and psychological harms to others.56 In proposing a 
legal solution to assimilation demands on children, I am cognizant that, 
when social conformity prevents legitimate harms, assimilation demands 
should be allowed. I deªne those legitimate harms in detail below, in Part 
II.B. 
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 See, e.g., Caldwell, supra note 37, at 385–90 (arguing for an interpretation of Title 
VII that protects expressions of racial identity); Rich, supra note 29, at 1202–12 (arguing 
for an interpretation of Title VII that protects performances of racial and ethnic identities 
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 See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 5, at 178 (proposing that parties who make assimila-
tion demands and parties who are burdened by demands should have “reason-forcing con-
versations” to discuss whether the demands are justiªable). 
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one’s self-concept that is developed by committing to particular values and goals associ-
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note 95 and accompanying text. 
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 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory par-
ticipation in the Pledge of Allegiance in schools unconstitutional). For a discussion of Bar-
nette, see infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text. 
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 Cf. Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent, and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal 
Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 199 (2006) (not-
ing that cultural defenses to violent crimes are largely unsuccessful). 
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Third, I believe that assimilation demands are sometimes less trou-
bling when individuals are able to avoid the demands by exiting the situa-
tion. For example, a church’s demands on its congregation and a political 
party’s demands on its members are less troubling so long as members 
can exit the group with ease.57 Children, however, usually lack the ability 
to avoid assimilation demands by exiting. Two major sources of assimila-
tion demands on children are their parents and the state. Children rely on 
their parents and the state for support, and thus these sources are difªcult 
for children to avoid. In this Article, I focus on crafting a legal response to 
assimilation demands from the state. Although parents’ assimilation de-
mands on children can also cause psychological wounds, the unique chal-
lenges to crafting a legal response to parents’ assimilation demands war-
rant discussion in a separate article.58 
B. The Case of Children 
The assimilation harms identiªed by legal scholars are magniªed when 
assimilation is demanded from children, especially adolescents. Children 
are more vulnerable to these harms because their capacity to deal with 
stressors is less than that of adults. Adolescents are particularly vulner-
able because they are at a stage of development during which individuals 
are most preoccupied with the psychological task of identity formation.59 
Thus, adolescents struggle with more identity-related stress than adults, 
while also lacking the full range of mechanisms that adults have for cop-
ing with stress. 
1. Children’s Coping Capacity 
Psychologists use the term “coping” to refer to individuals’ “con-
stantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage speciªc external 
and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the 
 
                                                                                                                             
57
 In previous writing, I have supported the idea that, under some limited circumstances, 
groups should have the right to demand conformity among their members, even if confor-
mity contravenes public policy goals. See Holning Lau, Transcending the Individualist 
Paradigm in Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1271, 1319 
(2006); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts 
of America can require its members to adopt heterosexual norms because the organiza-
tion’s freedom of expressive association trumps an antidiscrimination law proscribing sex-
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 American law has traditionally shielded the “private sphere” of the family from gov-
ernment intervention, save for exceptional circumstances. A discussion regarding the regu-
lation of parents’ assimilation demands requires a lengthy consideration of the pros and 
cons of this protection. For background and related criticisms, see Martha Albertson Fine-
man, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1207 (1999); Frances Ol-
sen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10 Const. 
Comment. 319 (1993). 
59
 See infra notes 75, 78–83 and accompanying text. 
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resources of the person.”60 In other words, coping refers to people’s ef-
forts to deal with stress.61 When coping is effective, individuals are de-
scribed as having developed “resilience.”62 The stressors that trigger cop-
ing range from daily hassles to catastrophic natural disasters.63 Stress, when 
not effectively mitigated, can undermine both psychological and physical 
well-being.64 
The capacity to cope develops during the course of one’s life and, 
therefore, adults are generally equipped with the greatest capacity.65 Al-
though researchers disagree on how to categorize particular coping tech-
niques, there is general agreement that coping techniques emerge throughout 
one’s life.66 Infants and young children tend to deal with stress through 
purely involuntary means, such as crying.67 As children develop their coping 
capacity, they usually develop passive techniques ªrst, ªnding ways to 
avoid stress, for example, by withdrawing from stressful social interac-
tions.68 With time, children develop more active forms of coping, such as 
thinking about problems, trying to ªnd solutions, and engaging in simple 
emotion-stabilizing exercises.69 During adolescence, individuals broaden 
their range of coping techniques and learn to employ those techniques more 
effectively.70 By adulthood, individuals usually employ an extensive range of 
both problem-solving and emotion-stabilizing techniques.71 
For the purposes of this Article, it is useful to note that two factors—
a strong sense of self and a supportive social network—contribute to one’s 
coping capacity. A strong sense of self empowers individuals to confront 
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 Richard S. Lazarus & Susan Folkman, Stress, Appraisal, and Coping 141 
(1984); see also Bruce E. Compas, et al., Coping with Stress During Childhood and Ado-
lescence: Problems, Progress, and Potential in Theory and Research, 127 Psychol. Bull. 
87, 88 (2001) (describing Lazarus and Folkman’s deªnition as the “most widely cited” in 
research on children’s coping). 
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 Some psychologists distinguish voluntary efforts from involuntary efforts, such as 
crying, and exclude involuntary efforts from their deªnition of coping. See Compas et al., 
supra note 60, at 91. 
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 Id. at 89. 
63
 Dianna T. Kenny, Psychological Foundations of Stress and Coping: A Developmen-
tal Perspective, in Stress and Health: Research and Clinical Applications 88–89 




 See Compas et al., supra note 60, at 91 (“Coping and other stress responses can be 
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 See Compas et al., supra note 60, at 91. 
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 Id. at 90. 
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 See Lazarus & Folkman, supra note 60 (describing in detail typologies of coping 
techniques). 
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stressful situations and reºect on those situations with greater clarity.72 
Supportive social networks provide people with interpersonal emotional 
support.73 As discussed below, children who face assimilation pressures 
often have weakened senses of self; for example, immigrant youth are more 
likely than nonimmigrant youth to suffer identity confusion.74 Moreover, 
children who face assimilation pressures may need to overcome certain 
hurdles before they seek interpersonal support; for example, gay and lesbian 
youth must be comfortable enough to identify openly before they can seek 
emotional support in coping with sexual orientation-related stress. Thus, 
the very nature of assimilation demands makes coping with them particu-
larly difªcult. 
2. Children’s Identity Development 
It is generally accepted that adolescence is the phase of human de-
velopment in which people are most preoccupied with identity struggles.75 
Most literature on identity development derives from the work of Erik Erik-
son. Although scholars have expanded upon Erikson’s work, his basic con-
cepts provide the foundation for understanding identity development.76 
Recognizing the legitimacy of his work, the Supreme Court has already 
cited him in three opinions.77 
According to Erikson, people face particular psychosocial challenges at 
various stages of life;78 resolution of these challenges is required for one’s 
health and growth.79 The primary psychosocial challenge of adolescence 
is to establish a well-developed identity.80 This is not to say that identity 
development is conªned to adolescence. People confront questions of iden-
tity from early childhood to late adulthood.81 However, it is during ado-
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 See Elizabeth Douvan, Erik Erikson: Critical Times, Critical Theory, 28 Child Psy-
chol. & Hum. Dev. 15, 18 (1997).  
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 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (citing Erikson, Youth and Cri-
sis, supra note 6, in a juvenile death penalty case); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
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increased conºict.” Erikson, Life Cycle, supra note 6, at 125. 
79
 Id. at 51–57. 
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 Id. at 94–100; Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, at 128–34. 
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 See Erikson, Youth and Crisis, supra note 6, at 91–96. 
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lescence that people are most preoccupied with the question, “Who am 
I?”82 Failure to resolve that question jeopardizes psychological health, 
resulting in symptoms ranging from reduced productivity to depression 
to difªculty engaging in intimate relationships.83 
A well-developed identity, as deªned by Erikson, is “the accrued conª-
dence that one’s ability to maintain inner sameness and continuity . . . is 
matched by the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others.”84 
That is to say, an individual’s identity is well developed when: (1) she has 
achieved a coherent sense of self—that is, an inner sameness—such that 
her thoughts and actions are not random but guided by speciªc principles 
and values; (2) that sense of self is continuous through time; and (3) the 
way she represents herself to others is consistent with that coherent and 
continuous sense of self.85 The third requirement of a well-developed iden-
tity is particularly important for this Article because individuals who face 
assimilation pressures often develop an unhealthy incongruence between 
their internal sense of self and their external representations of self.86 
Building on Erikson’s works, James Marcia identiªed four statuses 
in the process of identity formation: identity diffusion, identity foreclosure, 
moratorium, and identity achievement.87 Diffusion is the least-developed 
status. When an individual is in a state of identity diffusion, she has nei-
ther explored nor committed to any values or goals to shape her notions 
of self.88 In the state of foreclosure, an individual has committed to speciªc 
values and goals but has committed based on little or no exploration of 
alternatives. Often, adolescents in the state of foreclosure have simply 
adopted their parents’ goals and values without exploring alternatives.89 
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Marcia considers foreclosed identities to be underdeveloped, noting that 
people often abandon foreclosed identities to explore alternatives.90 Morato-
rium refers to the state of development in which people actively explore 
their identity without committing to any goals or values.91 In the state of 
identity achievement, which follows moratorium, individuals establish a 
strong identity by committing to a set of life goals and values.92 Although 
those goals and values may still evolve over time, they are relatively sta-
ble.93 
Identity is not synonymous with self-concept, although the two are 
often conºated in common parlance. In the tradition of Erikson and Marcia, 
identity is speciªcally the part of one’s self-concept that is developed94 by 
exploring and committing to particular values and goals associated with 
social categories such as religion, political ideology, gender, sexual ori-
entation, race, ethnicity, and so on.95 Thus, a person may be aware that she is 
afraid of heights. Being afraid of heights is part of her self-concept, but it 
is not a part of her identity because she did not develop an awareness of 
those fears by adopting particular values and goals. Society constructs 
the social categories that are salient to people’s identities.96 Categories like 
race and sexual orientation, for example, are particularly salient because 
history and social dynamics make people particularly aware of the alle-
giances they adopt with regard to those categories. 
Note that, even though people may be born with a particular racial 
phenotype or a predisposition for same-sex attraction,97 developing a sense 
of identity related to those biological traits is still a process—one that 
involves learning about, relating to, and committing to, socially constructed 
meanings associated with the biological status. For example, people who 
report feeling attraction to members of the same sex, and people who report 
having engaged in same-sex sexual behavior, do not always report a gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual identity.98 
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Because the case study in Part IV of this Article focuses on the rights of 
gay and lesbian youth, it is worth spending a moment to consider speciª-
cally the development of sexual orientation as a component of one’s identity. 
Developing speciªc components of one’s identity—such as one’s sexual 
orientation—comports with Erikson’s and Marcia’s theories.99 Put differ-
ently, a key developmental challenge for youth is to achieve a sense of 
sexual identity that is coherent and continuous while also consistent with 
external representations.100 That challenge is easier for straight youth than 
for gay and lesbian youth. Societal pressures have made heterosexuality 
the default sexual identity. Thus, youth with an inclination to opposite-sex 
intimacy can arrive at a stable heterosexual identity without much explo-
ration of their sexual goals and values.101 For youth with an inclination to-
ward same-sex intimacy, however, achieving a stable sexual identity requires 
transgressing the heterosexual default by exploring values such as gay 
pride and aspirations for same-sex relationships. Because society gener-
ally discourages the exploration and adoption of such values and goals, 
gay and lesbian youth face hurdles in forming a strong identity. Weak 
identities among gay and lesbian youth contribute to the increased likeli-
hood of poor psychological health, manifesting in both mental and physi-
cal symptoms.102 Youth belonging to other stigmatized minority groups 
also face difªcult challenges.103 
Erikson acknowledged this phenomenon when he observed that “the 
increasing demand for standardization, uniformity, and conformity” threat-
ens adolescents’ identity formation.104 Indeed, assimilation demands compel 
adolescents to commit outwardly to particular goals and values, without 
exploration, even when those goals and values conºict with the adolescents’ 
inner sense of self. In that regard, assimilation pressures hinder the for-
mation of minority youth identity, burdening them with considerable stress. 
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3. Compounded Effects of Assimilation 
At the very least, assimilation demands impose harms on individuals 
who belong to minority groups. The preceding sections suggest that the 
harms of assimilation are compounded when assimilation demands are 
imposed on children speciªcally. In light of these compounded harms, re-
quiring children to suppress minority group traits in order to ªt into a main-
stream is particularly troubling. The following three Parts detail how that 
normative claim can and should shape the law. 
Before proceeding to legal arguments, however, it is worth noting that 
assimilation’s compounded harms on children are not simply theoretical. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the compounded harms are alarmingly 
real. The evidence takes two forms. First, data show that minority youth 
contending with assimilation demands are more likely than other children 
to have poor psychological and physical health.105 Second, survey results 
show that greater identity achievement among minority youth corresponds 
to better psychological and physical health.106 
Consider gay and lesbian youth as an example. As discussed in Part 
IV, gay and lesbian youth are currently subject to striking assimilation 
demands. The majority of gay and lesbian youth cope with their increased 
stress and emerge from adolescence as healthy—and often remarkably 
resilient—adults.107 Nevertheless, research shows that, compared to youth 
generally, a disproportionate number of gay and lesbian youth suffer from 
poor psychological and physical health.108 Poor psychological health can 
lead to dire consequences. Survey-based studies since 1990 have consis-
tently shown that thirty to forty percent of gay and lesbian youth attempt 
suicide.109 That rate far exceeds the estimated three to ªfteen percent at-
tempt rate among all adolescents.110 Gay and lesbian youth are also more 
likely to attempt suicide than gay and lesbian adults.111 Although skeptics 
criticized the methodology used in early studies for relying on conven-
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334 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 42 
ience samples,112 four recent studies based on statewide school-population 
samples conªrm the ªgures from the earlier studies.113 
Meanwhile, survey-based studies reveal what ought to be self-evident: 
high self-esteem among gay and lesbian youth is directly related to their 
degree of comfort with homosexuality.114 One study directly asked high 
school students: “Are you comfortable with your sexual orientation?”115 The 
study found that students who were comfortable with their sexual orien-
tation had higher measures of both mental and physical health.116 Straight 
students who were comfortable with their sexual orientation were the 
healthiest; gay students who were uncomfortable were the least healthy.117 
Studies also show that self-esteem is directly related to disclosure of sex-
ual identity, which is a sign of identity achievement.118 This research sug-
gests that the high suicide rate among gay and lesbian youth can be re-
duced by protecting them from assimilation demands, which breed self-
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 Id. at 302. Students’ mental health was measured through their reporting of issues 
such as depression, suicide, stress, anxiety, family problems, self-harm, temper problems, 
life and social dissatisfaction, and loneliness; general health was measured through report-
ing on factors such as growth, headaches, and chronic diseases. See id. at 299.  
117
 Id. at 300–02. 
118
 See, e.g., Savin-Williams, supra note 107, at 128 (ªnding a relationship between 
coming out and self-esteem among gay and lesbian youth); Stephanie K. Swann & Chris-
tina A. Spivey, The Relationship Between Self-Esteem and Lesbian Identity During Adoles-
cence, 21 Child & Adolescent Soc. Work J. 629, 632 (2004) (summarizing existing 
research showing that disclosure of sexual identity, inter alia, is “speciªcally relevant to 
lesbian adolescents’ self-esteem”). Although these studies do not conclusively show that 
disclosure causes higher self-esteem, they warrant attention. If disclosure does not produce 
self-esteem, but self-esteem produces disclosure, one can hypothesize that disclosure is an 
important part of maintaining self-esteem. Disclosure is a sign of identity achievement be-
cause congruence between one’s inner sense of self and one’s outward representation of 
that self is necessary for identity achievement. 
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denial and make it more difªcult for gay and lesbian youth to achieve stable 
identities. 
These ªndings are not unique to the context of sexual orientation. Re-
search on ethnicity consistently shows that adolescents who strongly iden-
tify with an ethnic group have greater psychological well-being than their 
peers.119 These ªndings suggest that, to avoid jeopardizing the health of 
minority youth, the law should be conducive to the identity achievement 
of minority adolescents; disfavoring assimilationist laws would contrib-
ute to this end. 
II. The Pluralism Principle 
How should the law protect children from harmful assimilation de-
mands? Most existing legal scholarship on assimilation proposes reform-
ing statutory employment law.120 Because most children are not employed, 
those legal proposals are insufªcient. 
Rather than focus on employers, I focus on the government as a source 
of assimilation demands. Both in the United States and abroad, assimila-
tion demands on children often come directly from the state, especially 
from public schools. For example, when the French government banned 
girls from wearing headscarves to school, it demanded that Muslim girls 
assimilate by muting their religious identity.121 Similarly, when the groom-
ing codes at American schools have the effect of banning Native Ameri-
can hairstyles, they require Native American youth to downplay their ethnic 
identity.122 
Pluralism is the antidote to assimilation demands. Thus, as stated at 
the beginning of this Article, I propose a two-pronged pluralism principle 
for children’s rights jurisprudence. According to the ªrst prong, sociali-
zation of children is generally acceptable, but the government must avoid 
socialization policies that undermine children’s ability to develop and ex-
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 See Eunai K. Shrake & Siyon Rhee, Ethnic Identity as a Predictor of Problem Be-
haviors Among Korean American Adolescents, 39 Adolescence 601, 602–03 (2004) (con-
cluding that achievement of an ethnic identity corresponds with “self-esteem and psycho-
logical well-being as measured in self-worth, sense of mastery, purpose in life, and social 
competence,” while “feelings of role confusion and alienation resulting from ethnic iden-
tity conºicts can lead to psychological as well as behavioral problems for ethnic minority 
adolescents”); see also Joseph D. Hovey & Cheryl A. King, Acculturative Stress, Depres-
sion, and Suicidal Ideation among Immigrant and Second-Generation Latino Adolescents, 
35 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psych. 1183, 1188–90 (1990) (presenting evidence 
that ªrst- and second-generation Latino adolescents in the United States are more likely to 
experience depression and suicidal ideation than adolescents generally, and that this likeli-
hood correlates with the amount of acculturation stress reported by the adolescents).  
120
 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 4; Caldwell, supra note 37; Carbado & Gulati, Work-
ing Identity, supra note 4; Perea, supra note 51; Rich, supra note 29. 
121
 See supra note 12. 
122
 See New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to a school grooming code with a hair-length requirement that pro-
hibited Pawnee students from wearing traditional Native American hairstyles). 
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press their identities. This requirement creates a presumption against state-
sanctioned assimilation demands. According to the second prong, the gov-
ernment can rebut the presumption by showing that protecting a child’s 
exercise of identity interests would generate cognizable harms to the child 
herself or to others. I offer a narrow deªnition of cognizable harms below. 
In the remainder of this Part, I ªrst clarify the pluralism principle by 
comparing and contrasting it with some other commentators’ proposals 
regarding children’s rights. I then deªne in more detail each of the prin-
ciple’s prongs. 
A. The Principle’s Liberatory Function 
Before proceeding, I should clarify that the pluralism principle is not 
synonymous with a positive right to identity development. Instead, the prin-
ciple is a normative proposition that guides determinations regarding 
whether to afford negative liberties to children.123 
Indeed, the impetus for the pluralism principle is to protect children 
from the state’s assimilation demands. Accordingly, the principle suggests 
that children should have the right to demand that the government refrain 
from policies that undermine their identity interests, such as bans on head-
scarves and Native American hairstyles. However, the principle does not 
obligate the government to take positive actions to facilitate identity de-
velopment, such as institutionalizing events on Islamic awareness or Na-
tive American pride. 
The pluralism principle is a starting point. I acknowledge that the 
principle’s negative liberties are necessary but probably insufªcient to pro-
tect children’s identity development fully. Perhaps children ought to have 
a positive right to particular types of education that foster identity devel-
opment.124 Perhaps children ought to have a positive right to government 
intervention when parents’ assimilation demands become unbearable.125 I 
bracket these issues regarding potential positive rights for a future article; 
they warrant additional consideration because deªning and enforcing posi-
tive rights pose unique challenges.126 In the meantime, this Article focuses 
on children’s freedom from governmental assimilation demands. 
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 Negative rights entail freedom from government interference, whereas positive rights 
entail government assistance in actualizing the decisions that one freely makes. On the 
difference between negative and positive rights, see generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Con-
cepts of Liberty (1958). 
124
 For an argument in favor of children’s positive rights, see Tamar Ezer, A Positive 
Right to Protection for Children, 7 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1 (2004). 
125
 See supra note 58. 
126
 On the difªculty of deªning and enforcing positive rights, see Frank B. Cross, The 
Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 857 (2001). For counterarguments, see Stephen 
Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost of Rights: Why Liberty Depends on Taxes 
(1999); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271 (1990). 
State governments already afford some positive rights to children, such as rights to educa-
tion and shelter. See Teitelbaum, supra note 20, at 804–06. 
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Existing theories of children’s rights are often either liberationist or 
protectionist.127 In contrast, the pluralism principle is a hybrid; while it is 
liberatory in practice, its normative underpinnings are protectionist in 
nature. Drawing from psychological literature, the principle embodies the 
idea that liberation can be a form of protection. By allowing children to 
explore and express identity-forming values freely, the principle protects 
children from the harms of incomplete identity development. By giving 
children the liberty required for identity moratorium and identity achieve-
ment, the principle protects children from psychological harm. 
The pluralism principle diverges from traditional liberal theory. Early 
liberal theorists such as John Stuart Mill explicitly denied negative liber-
ties to children. Mill argued that children lacked the competency required 
for autonomous decisionmaking and, therefore, that granting children 
freedom would harm them.128 Child liberationists often challenge the as-
sumption that children lack competency. Some advocates have argued that 
children should be presumed competent unless proven otherwise.129 Other 
commentators have since criticized those proposals for being unworkable 
because it is difªcult to deªne and measure competence and because people 
develop competency at different rates.130 
I eschew the traditional liberal emphasis on competency as a requi-
site for exercises of liberty.131 Mill and contemporary opponents to chil-
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 Child liberationists argue for increasing children’s autonomy rights. The original 
child liberationists from the 1970s compared children to other oppressed classes, such as 
women and racial minorities. For examples of liberationist literature, see John Holt, Es-
cape from Childhood (1974); John Holt, Why Not a Bill of Rights for Children?, in The 
Children’s Rights Movement: Overcoming the Oppression of Young People 319 
(1977); Rodham, supra note 9. Protectionists argue not for children’s autonomy rights but 
for welfare rights that protect children from harm, such as rights to nutrition and shelter. 
See Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reserva-
tions About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” 1976 BYU L. Rev. 605, 644–50 (1976) 
(arguing for child protectionism and against child liberation); Teitelbaum, supra note 20, at 
804–06 (discussing children’s welfare rights). 
128
 In discussing liberty, Mill remarked: “We are not speaking of children . . . . Those 
who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against 
their own actions as well as against external injury.” Mill, supra note 18, at 14. 
129
 See, e.g., Robert Batey, The Rights of Adolescents, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 363, 
373 (1982) (arguing that “in a situation in which the state would defer to the desires of an 
adult, the state can refuse to defer to the considered desires of an adolescent only upon a 
showing that the adolescent is not competent to make the decision”); Rodham, supra note 
9, at 508 (arguing to “abolish the status of minority and to reverse its underlying presump-
tion of children’s incompetency”).  
130
 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to 
Children’s Rights, 9 Harv. Women’s L.J. 1, 5 (1986) (arguing that “there are [no] know-
able boundaries between competence and incompetence for any given societal task” and 
that “[t]here are no uncontroversial principles to pinpoint the kinds of competencies crucial 
to accord an individual independent decision-making power and to relinquish paternalist 
control”). 
131
 See Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A 
Postfeminist Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 983, 985 (1993) (“It 
is my contention not only that competency is unnecessary to any formulation of rights for 
children, but also that it is extremely conªning to rights theory in ways that make it difªcult to 
338 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 42 
dren’s autonomy rights claim that the competency requirement protects 
children from the potentially harmful consequences of their own deci-
sions.132 However, as illustrated in the previous Part, autonomous explo-
ration and expression of identity is not intrinsically harmful; rather, it is a 
requirement for healthy psychological development. Accordingly, the plural-
ism principle presumes that children’s freedom to exercise identity inter-
ests should be protected, unless the state satisªes a showing of harm.133 
Unlike many existing liberal arguments for children’s rights, the plural-
ism principle hinges on a harm-based inquiry instead of a competency-based 
inquiry. Competency is a second-order question that only matters if the 
state ªrst shows harm. 
The principle’s harm-based approach to children’s rights is inspired 
by the writings of Emily Buss, who has asserted that, in deciding what 
autonomy rights to extend to children, the government should consider how 
extending such rights would foster or harm child development.134 The plural-
ism principle builds on that idea by establishing a legal presumption that 
fosters identity-related aspects of child development and by narrowly deªn-
ing the types of harms that would counter that presumption. 
B. Protecting Identity Interests 
The pluralism principle’s ªrst prong protects children’s exercise of 
identity interests: the development and expression of identity. Protecting 
children’s identity development means protecting children’s ability to attain 
moratorium and achievement statuses. In other words, it means protect-
ing children’s ability to develop a sense of self by exploring and commit-
ting to goals and values associated with different social categories.135 Pro-
 
                                                                                                                             
conceptualize, much less acknowledge, the rights of children and other groups.”); Melinda 
A. Roberts, Parent and Child in Conºict: Between Liberty and Responsibility, 10 Notre 
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 485, 514–15 (1996) (arguing that “children [should] have 
a right of liberty . . . only in those particular circumstances in which the child’s choice in 
fact serves his or her own best interests”). 
132
 See Mill, supra note 18, at 14; Hafen supra note 127, at 650. 
133
 Note that the pluralism principle protects children qua children. In contrast, some 
commentators have argued that children should have some freedoms because they are po-
tential adults; the idea is that giving children some autonomy prepares children for the deci-
sions that they will face as adults. See Sharon Bishop, Children, Autonomy and the Right to 
Self-Determination, in Whose Child? 174 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). 
I reject merely viewing children as potential adults because such a view ignores the fact 
that, when children are denied certain liberties, they suffer immediate harms as children. 
See Minow, Children’s Rights, supra note 20, at 296 n.160. 
134
 See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 17, at 35. 
135
 See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. Because the pluralism principle pro-
tects exploration of ºuid goals and values, it rejects the notion that people belong in rigid, 
ªxed identity categories. For example, an American of Asian descent can explore and 
choose to adopt goals and values that she may or may not label as “Asian American.” In-
deed, the pluralism principle protects, for example, the individual of Asian descent who 
identiªes, in the psychological sense, with goals and values typically associated with peo-
ple of another racial phenotype. There is no correct way to be Asian American, and an individ-
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tecting children’s identity expression means protecting children’s ability 
to make outward representations of that internal sense of self.136 
Often particular conduct constitutes a prima facie exercise of identity 
interests: for example, wearing a shirt that reads “gay and proud,” wearing a 
yarmulke, or joining the Young Republicans of America. These exercises 
should be protected. Surely, whether conduct constitutes an exercise of 
identity interests will not always be clear. However, the difªcult cases nei-
ther detract from the principle’s normative weight nor render the relatively 
easy cases any less worthy of legal protection.137 
An opponent of the pluralism principle might worry that protecting 
identity interests would create a slippery slope. For example, some might 
argue that shy people constitute an identity group. Under the principle, 
would a shy student have a claim against a teacher who requires her stu-
dents to study public speaking? Below I explain why such worry about slip-
pery slopes is unwarranted. Personality traits, such as shyness, can be 
distinguished from identities, such as racial, religious, and sexual identi-
ties.138 
As explained above, individuals develop identities through a process 
of exploring and committing to goals and values associated with particu-
lar social categories.139 For example, even if someone is born to black par-
ents, she only develops a sense of black identity through a process of 
learning and adopting goals and values associated with the black com-
munity.140 Similarly, there are shared goals and values within the Jewish 
community, the gay and lesbian community, and other identity groups, 
that an individual may adopt or reject as a part of her identiªcation proc-
ess. In contrast, one does not develop a “shy identity” by committing to 
values and goals associated with shy people. The pluralism principle fo-
cuses on the suppression of identities because of the particularly harmful 
effects of that process.141 
This Article does not articulate a comprehensive list of social catego-
ries that are worth discussing. Not all social categories are equally relevant 
to a person’s sense of self. In this Article, I focus on the categories of 
race, ethnicity, religion, political opinion, disability, sexual orientation, and 
 
                                                                                                                             
ual with an Asian phenotype may identify, for example, with black identity. See Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded as” 
Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 Wis. L. 
Rev. 1283 (arguing that Title VII should prohibit discrimination against people who are 
not phenotypically black but identify with, or are regarded by others as, being black). 
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 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
137
 Compare the exercise of identity interests to the exercise of religion. Whether par-
ticular conduct constitutes an exercise of religion has often vexed courts. However, those 
difªcult cases do not suggest that the Free Exercise Clause should be amended out of the 
Bill of Rights. 
138
 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
139
 See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
140
 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
141
 See supra Part I.B (discussing harms).  
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gender identity, because those categories are particularly relevant to a 
person’s sense of self. These categories are not relevant by nature. They 
are relevant because, historically, social prejudice based on these statuses 
has been pervasive, rendering these statuses socially salient. Perhaps one 
day society truly will be colorblind.142 Or perhaps one day an individual’s 
choice of intimate partner will be no more socially salient than her choice of 
a favorite ice cream ºavor. Until that day arrives, however, people will 
continue to be particularly self-aware of their identities based on the afore-
mentioned categories.143 Accordingly, attacking someone’s identity with 
regard to these categories is particularly injurious and worthy of censure. 
C. Exceptional Cases: Preventing Cognizable Harms 
Although the ªrst prong of the pluralism principle presumes that all 
identities deserve protection, the government can rebut that presumption 
and legitimately impose assimilation demands if it shows that by doing 
so it prevents harms. For example, the government can prohibit children’s 
exercise of Neo-Nazi identity if it shows that the conduct is sufªciently 
violent or hateful to constitute a cognizable harm. Below, I clarify the cate-
gories of cognizable harm that the government can invoke to rebut the prin-
ciple’s presumption against assimilation demands. 
In developing and expressing her identity, a child will sometimes 
impose harms on herself or on others. Those harms legitimize government 
infringement of that child’s identity interests. However, only a narrow scope 
of harms should be cognizable under law. 
1. Binding Commitments as Harms to Self 
What constitutes a cognizable harm to a child’s self? The state must 
exercise restraint in construing such harm. Because the pluralism princi-
ple is meant to protect difference, the state must not make subjective 
judgments about whether any particular exercise of identity is culturally 
or morally desirable. Thus, for example, the government should not limit 
a young girl’s access to genital mutilation practitioners simply because 
the government views the practice as lacking legitimate cultural purposes. 
However, the government may limit that access because, by agreeing to 
genital mutilation, a young girl commits to a decision that is difªcult to 
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 Of course, whether colorblindness is desirable in the ªrst place is disputed. See 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning To Think and 
Talk about Race, Again, 15 B.C. Third World L.J. 1 (1995). 
143
 Cf. Charles Stangor et al., Categorization of Individuals on the Basis of Multiple 
Social Features, 62 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 207, 208 (1992) (“[S]ocial catego-
ries are well learned . . . . [B]ecause they are [perceived to be] highly informative about 
underlying dispositions, social categories such as race and sex may be used so frequently 
in social perception that their use becomes habitual and automatic, occurring without con-
scious thought or effort.”). 
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undo.144 The state invokes a cognizable harm when it shows that, by exer-
cising her identity, a child is making a binding commitment—either in a 
physical sense or a legal sense. 
Children are less capable of fully assessing relevant factors before 
making decisions.145 Accordingly, there is good reason to preserve a child’s 
ability to change her mind on important decisions.146 This logic has been 
incorporated, for example, into contract law. Contract law generally pro-
tects children from their own commitments by rendering contracts unen-
forceable when they involve child signatories.147 By the same rationale, 
the government may justiªably restrict children’s exercises of identity that 
bind them to consequences that are difªcult to undo. For children, such 
self-binding amounts to a cognizable harm. 
Generally speaking, binding commitments fall into two categories: 
decisions of a legal nature, such as marriage, and conduct with bodily con-
sequences.148 Conduct with bodily consequences, such as genital mutila-
tion, involves binding commitments because changes to one’s body are 
often difªcult to undo. As James Marcia has pointed out, exploring and 
“committing” to social values and goals is an important part of adoles-
cent identity development.149 When Marcia spoke of commitment, how-
ever, he did not mean commitment in any binding sense. There is direc-
tional freedom in moving between competing values associated with so-
cial categories—for example, liberal and conservative, masculine and 
feminine, heteronormative and queer, Christian and Buddhist. Although 
one may feel committed to certain values, such intangible allegiance is not 
binding in the same way as legal or bodily consequences, and individuals 
are free to return to their starting positions. 
Thus exercising identity interests usually does not require making 
binding commitments. For example, wearing a yarmulke does not preclude 
someone from converting to another religion. Similarly, protesting a war 
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 My argument here is normative rather than descriptive. As a descriptive matter, sub-
jective cultural factors probably play a signiªcant role in the promulgation of laws regulat-
ing female genital mutilation.  
145
 See Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 355, 358–59 [hereinafter Buss, Constitutional Fidelity]. 
146
 See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, supra note 17, at 41 (“[T]he ongoing 
process of identity development, which continues through adolescence, compromises the 
extent to which it is appropriate to bind an individual at Time 2 to the choices made by that 
individual, as a child, at Time 1.”). 
147
 See Martin R. Gardner & Anne Profªtt Dupre, Children and the Law 
410–17 (2002). 
148
 Similarly, age-of-consent laws regulating sexual intimacy are justiªed even if they 
assimilate adolescents to majoritarian moral codes. Consent to sex has a legal nature. By 
consenting to the act of sexual intimacy, one essentially agrees to waive certain rights, such 
as the right to press charges for rape. 
149
 See Franklin E. Zimring, Changing Legal World of Adolescence 65–72 
(1982) (arguing that adolescence should be viewed as something like a driver’s permit for 
adulthood, during which individuals experiment with different values); supra notes 87–93 
and accompanying text.  
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does not bind someone to an antiwar position. Holding hands with a same-
sex partner also does not bind someone to being gay. 
Insofar as the pluralism principle’s second prong is concerned, bind-
ing commitments are the only cognizable harm to oneself. A respect for dif-
ference prohibits the government from making subjective determinations 
about whether a particular exercise of identity is culturally or morally desir-
able, but the state can make a more objective determination that an exer-
cise of identity interests has enduring consequences. Thus, the state can 
require greater maturity from individuals who engage in such behavior.150 
2. Harms to Others 
The state also has a legitimate interest in limiting a child’s exercise 
of identity if that exercise harms others. This limitation is a partial incor-
poration of John Stuart Mill’s harm principle into the pluralism princi-
ple.151 Because the purpose of the pluralism principle is to protect chil-
dren from assimilation demands, the state cannot assert that the commu-
nity is harmed simply because children’s exercises of identity interests 
offend the community’s majoritarian sensibilities. Changes in community 
norms are not intrinsically harmful. As H. L. A. Hart persuasively argued, 
there is no empirical support for the claim that deviation from community 
mores—in and of itself—harms the community, unless the term “harm” is 
conºated with “change.”152 
Accordingly, I offer a narrow deªnition of cognizable harms to oth-
ers. These include (1) incitement of other children to harm themselves153 
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 The pluralism principle merely gives the government discretion to infringe upon 
identity interests when long-term consequences are at stake. The state is not obligated to 
regulate children’s actions whenever those actions lead to long-term consequences. For exam-
ple, lawmakers may very well determine that some actions—such as ear piercing—have 
relatively inconsequential long-term effects that do not warrant regulation. 
151
 See Mill, supra note 18, at 165 (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be right-
fully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”). I discuss, in notes 131–133 and accompanying text, supra, why I reject 
Mill’s wholesale exclusion of children. Mill argued that harm to others is the only 
justiªcation for limiting adults’ freedom. See Mill, supra note 18, at 165. Because I am 
writing about children, my claim is much more modest. The pluralism principle’s ªrst prong 
states that the government may limit children’s freedom for socialization purposes, except 
when the freedom at stake implicates identity interests. Not all conduct involves identity 
interests. Since the state may limit a child’s exercise of identity when that exercise harms 
the child herself, the pluralism principle protects signiªcantly fewer freedoms than Mill’s 
broader harm principle. 
152
 See H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality 49–51 (1963). According to Hart, 
the notion that changes in morality are inherently harmful is “entitled to no more respect 
than the Emperor Justinian’s statement that homosexuality was the cause of earthquakes.” 
Id. at 50. 
153
 In other words, the state may intervene when children incite other children to make 
binding commitments of either a legal or bodily nature, as discussed in Part II.B.1, supra. 
Typically, states will exercise this power in school contexts. Thus, for example, even if a 
student believes strongly in the legalization and consumption of certain drugs—whether 
for religious, cultural, or political reasons—a school may be permitted to prevent that stu-
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and (2) harms to others’ protected interests—such as privacy, physical 
well-being, and property interests.154 
Regarding the question of harm, two particular situations are uniquely 
complex and warrant further discussion: when a child’s exercise of iden-
tity interests challenges her parents’ desires, and when her exercise of 
identity interests compromises other children’s identity interests. 
a. Parents’ Childrearing Interests 
Can the state’s allowance of a child’s exercise of identity interests 
harm her parents by infringing their protected interest in childrearing? 
For example, consider a child who wants to explore Buddhism by borrowing 
books on Buddhism from the school library, even though her devout Chris-
tian parents object to her interest. Should the school limit the child’s identity 
exploration in order to protect her parent’s childrearing interests? 
As long as the government protects children’s exercise of identity in-
terest through negative liberties, parents’ childrearing interests generally 
are not infringed. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution pro-
tects parents’ rights to direct the upbringing of their children, especially 
with regard to religion,155 but that protection is limited.156 The Constitu-
tion protects parents’ rights to remove their children from public schools 
 
                                                                                                                             
dent from openly preaching drug use to her classmates because drug use entails bodily 
consequences and a legal decision, i.e., to break the law. However, the school may only 
intervene if the student’s classmates are vulnerable to peer pressure, which will depend on 
their maturity. As this Article goes to publication, the Supreme Court is poised to release 
its decision in Frederick v. Morse, a case in which a high school principal punished stu-
dents for displaying a banner stating, “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.” 439 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2006), 
cert. granted, 127 S.Ct. 722 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2006). Under the pluralism principle, the princi-
pal’s actions only would be justiªed, as a normative matter, if she could show that the ban-
ner was likely to incite drug use, and not just parody the school’s position against drugs. 
154
 See Feinberg, supra note 18, at 38–62, 105–06 (1984) (clarifying Mill’s principle 
by deªning harms in terms of setbacks to others’ protected interests). 
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 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that Amish parents’ free 
exercise right to direct children’s religious upbringing outweighed state interests in man-
dating schooling for children until the age of sixteen); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 
284 (1927) (invalidating state regulations of private schools because the regulations vio-
lated parents’ substantive due process right to direct their children’s education); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects par-
ents’ right to send their children to private religious schools in lieu of public schools); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause protects parents’ right to employ a private school teacher to instruct their children 
in foreign languages). For a thorough criticism of these cases and the notion of parents’ 
rights, see James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doc-
trine of Parents’ Rights, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1371 (1994); see also Emily Buss, The Adoles-
cent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1233, 1276–88 (2000) (relying on Eriksonian psychological literature to question 
the appropriateness of home schooling and private religious schooling for older adoles-
cents). 
156
 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (explaining, in a case in-
volving child labor laws, that parents’ interest in directing children’s religious upbringing 
is not absolute); infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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and educate their children through private institutions or home school-
ing.157 However, parents do not have a protected interest in having the state 
take steps to facilitate their childrearing.158 Therefore, “preventing harm 
to parents” does not implicate the pluralism principle’s second prong. 
Protecting parents’ rights, for example, does not require public schools to 
alter their curricular requirements, textbooks, or school activities just to 
further parents’ childrearing goals. Indeed, parents have argued that their 
childrearing interests were infringed when schools’ sex education and con-
dom distribution policies conºicted with their childrearing goals, and these 
arguments have generally failed in court.159 
b. Other Children’s Identity Interests 
Can the state, by protecting a child’s identity interests, set back other 
children’s identity interests? Indeed, in cases of hate speech, a child speaker 
might harm another child’s identity development in the process of express-
ing her own identity. I argue the state can legitimately impose assimila-
tion demands in public schools when doing so prevents the harms caused 
by hate speech.160 
The pluralism principle’s second prong only gives a public school the 
discretion to restrict a child speaker’s negative liberties when it considers 
her expression to be hate speech.161 The principle does not grant children 
a free-standing positive right to hate speech intervention. Pinpointing a 
precise deªnition of hate speech is difªcult, and thus enforcing a positive 
right to protection from hate speech would be difªcult. However, granting 
schools a degree of discretion is not novel. Current law already grants public 
schools broad discretion to foresee and preempt other harms, such as stu-
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conºicting opinions. I evaluate these conºicting opinions in Part IV.B, infra. 
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 The pluralism principle only justiªes the regulation of hate speech in contexts in-
volving child speakers and child audiences; regulating child speakers—but not adult 
speakers—makes sense as a legal matter because children have always possessed less free-
dom of expression than adults. See infra Part IV.B. Protecting child audiences makes sense 
because of children’s particular vulnerabilities. See supra Part I.B; see also Richard 
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words That Wound 93–109 (2004) (dis-
cussing hate speech and the special case of children). 
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dents’ infringements upon other students’ privacy interests and physical 
safety.162 The pluralism principle simply puts identity interests on par with 
these other protected interests because, as discussed in Part I, infringement 
of identity interests can seriously undermine children’s psychological and 
physical health. 
Although the state has discretion to regulate hate speech among stu-
dents, there are minimum requirements for expression to be deemed hate 
speech. A gay teenager might associate Christian fundamentalism with 
homophobia, and thus be offended by even the slightest expression of Chris-
tian fundamentalism, but the state should not suppress all such expression. 
Expressions of Christian fundamentalist pride do not necessarily harm gays 
and lesbians. To constitute the type of hate speech that is a cognizable harm, 
the fundamentalist’s speech must directly attack other children, suggest-
ing that they are to be despised and denied respect because of their iden-
tity.163 Such hateful speech is an assimilation demand that undermines iden-
tity development. Hate speech is an assimilation demand because it es-
sentially suggests that members of the targeted group need to abandon or 
suppress their identity as much as possible, or leave the community be-
cause their identity is despised and unworthy of respect.164 
The state may err on the cautious side, opting to intervene rarely. 
Some forms of expression, however, present easy cases. When a child wears 
a shirt declaring “Islam: Rotten to the Core”165 or “God Hates Fags,”166 the 
speech seems to say rather clearly that members of certain identity groups 
should be despised and denied respect. 
Most debates on social issues need not devolve into hate speech. For 
example, classroom debates over whether homosexuality is immutable or 
whether same-sex marriage should be banned, while controversial, should 
generally be acceptable under the pluralism principle’s second prong be-
cause they do not inherently suggest that gays and lesbians should be de-
spised and denied respect. Indeed, the same-sex marriage debate largely 
 
                                                                                                                             
162
 See infra note 262 and accompanying text (on privacy); infra notes 249–250 ac-
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 This deªnition of hate speech draws from Canadian jurisprudence. See R. v. Keeg-
stra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 777 (Can.) (“[H]atred[,] . . . if exercised against members of an 
identiªable group, implies that those individuals are to be despised, scorned, denied re-
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the salute. See infra notes 182–187 and accompanying text. In contrast, hate speech is by 
deªnition a denial of respect. 
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 For an online vendor selling T-shirts with this slogan, see Café Press, http://www.cafe 
press.com/religion_01 (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). 
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 For a photograph of children wearing T-shirts stating “GOD HATES FAGS.COM,” 
see Vox Hunt: Sign O’ The Times GOD HATES FAGS!, http://dancingbear.vox.com/library/ 
post/vox-hunt-sign-o-the-times-god-hates-fags.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). 
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has been over whether the government has other interests, aside from hate, 
that legitimize same-sex marriage bans.167 
In contrast, schools should have the discretion to decide that debates 
over whether particular identity groups should be hated have no place on 
school grounds (even if the debate creates no physical disturbances) be-
cause arguments on one side of the debate will amount to hate speech. Chil-
dren should not be expected to protect themselves against hate speech be-
cause they are particularly vulnerable to the crippling effects of assimila-
tion demands, including hate speech. A child who is attacked in this way 
is not empowered to respond with defensive speech. 
III. Uncovering the Pluralism Principle in Existing Law 
In the remainder of this Article, I focus on how the pluralism princi-
ple relates to constitutional law. Although courts have never clearly articu-
lated the pluralism principle, it seems already to inºuence the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in cases involving children’s constitutional rights. Dif-
ferent cases have implicitly embraced different parts of the pluralism princi-
ple. My goal is to uncover and piece together the pluralism principle, which 
has been emerging in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on children’s 
rights. 
The pluralism principle has been manifested as both a shield and a 
sword. In some cases, children have successfully raised the principle as a 
shield, preventing the government from limiting their rights in relation to 
those of adults; I refer to these cases as regarding equal rights to those of 
adults. In at least one other case, the pluralism principle has been wielded as 
a sword to justify affording children more negative liberty than adults. I 
refer to such cases as regarding special rights.168 
In this Part, I ªrst provide background on constitutional principles 
that are not explicitly stated in the Constitution’s text. I then show how the 
pluralism principle has begun to inform the Court’s decisions—ªrst in 
cases regarding children’s equal rights and then in cases regarding chil-
dren’s special rights. 
A. Constitutional Principles Generally 
Legal principles, which ªll lacunae within the Constitution’s text, have 
a history of guiding judicial decisionmaking, including that of the Supreme 
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 See, e.g., Andersen v. King, 138 P.3d 963, 980–81 (Wash. 2006) (disagreeing with 
plaintiffs that Washington’s same-sex marriage ban was motivated only by antigay animus); 
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 2006) (reaching the same conclusion regarding 
New York’s same-sex marriage ban). 
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 I borrow the term “special rights” from Buss, who has written extensively on how 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), suggests that children have not only equal constitu-
tional rights but special constitutional rights. See Buss, Allocating Developmental Control, 
supra note 17, at 47; Buss, Constitutional Fidelity, supra note 145, at 356. 
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Court.169 Some principles guide constitutional decisionmaking generally, 
as opposed to decisionmaking concerning one particular constitutional pro-
vision. For example, the principle of constitutional avoidance guides consti-
tutional decisionmaking generally, dictating that the Court will construe 
statutes so that they do not infringe the Constitution.170 Recently, constitu-
tional law scholars have argued that an equality principle guides the 
Court’s decisionmaking not only in equal protection cases, but also in sub-
stantive due process and First Amendment cases.171 
Just as equality can be articulated as a principle that guides constitu-
tional decisionmaking generally, the pluralism principle for children’s 
rights should also guide decisionmaking in a range of cases—from First 
Amendment, to due process, to equal protection cases.172 As discussed be-
low, the pluralism principle and its expansive reach are both grounded in 
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
Nowhere in its text does the Constitution specify how constitutional 
rights affect children. The Court has been ªlling in that gap through case 
law, and the pluralism principle has been emerging from that case law.173 
B. The Principle and Children’s Equal Rights 
Children’s identity interests are implicated in various constitutional 
contexts. Freedom of expression and free religious exercise both foster chil-
dren’s abilities to develop and express their religious identities, including 
religious identity speciªcally. Minority children’s identity interests are im-
plicated when the government invokes majoritarian community standards 
to restrict liberties that minority children value, such as the liberty to speak a 
foreign language. Unequal treatment not only deprives some children of a 
good, but also stigmatizes the disadvantaged group, undermining the iden-
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tablishment Clause cases); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1103 
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tection. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624 
(1980). 
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Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1893, 1899 (2004) (comparing the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence to deriving a 
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tity development of its members. Accordingly, the legal analysis that fol-
lows focuses on cases regarding freedom of expression, free religious 
exercise, substantive due process, and equal protection.174 
In In re Gault, the Supreme Court famously declared that “neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”175 How-
ever, the Court subsequently asserted, in Bellotti v. Baird, that “three rea-
sons justify[ ] the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children 
cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of chil-
dren; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature 
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.”176 Al-
though the Court has identiªed these three factors, it has not clariªed how 
these factors interact. As a result, critics charge that the Supreme Court’s 
children’s rights jurisprudence lacks coherence.177 The pluralism princi-
ple reveals previously unrecognized coherence in that jurisprudence. 
Assessing vulnerability is the ªrst-order task, and that is when the plu-
ralism principle comes into play. When the state argues that children’s 
rights should be more limited than those of adults, it typically begins by 
asserting that children are vulnerable to speciªc harms and that rights reduc-
tion is a form of protection. When the Court ªnds that states have not iden-
tiªed cognizable harms to which children are vulnerable, the Court extends 
equal rights to the child.178 Only when the state has identiªed a cogniza-
ble harm does the Court engage in signiªcant analyses regarding the two 
other Bellotti factors: maturity and deference to parents.179 
In the Court’s assessment of vulnerability, it has implicitly raised the 
pluralism principle to defend children’s freedom to exercise identity in-
terests from governmental socialization policies. In cases where children’s 
ability to develop and express their identities has been at stake, the Court 
has repeatedly stated that children are not vulnerable to harm just because 
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 Although there are many free exercise cases that involve children, I only address W. 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). I do not devote more attention to 
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When children are not vulnerable to cognizable harms, their well-being is not at risk. 
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they do not conform to majoritarian community norms.180 In essence, the 
Court has stated that the government’s desire for children to conform to 
majoritarian norms is not reason enough to infringe children’s identity 
interests. The Court has repeatedly protected children’s ability to explore 
and express unorthodox values associated with minority identities. This 
protection comports with the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong. The Court 
has only infringed upon children’s identity interests in cases where doing 
so prevented harms that are cognizable under the pluralism principle’s 
second prong.181 
1. Protecting Identity Interests 
a. Foundational Cases 
The Court planted the seed of the pluralism principle in West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.182 Barnette was not formally a 
children’s rights case because parents brought the suit, but Justice Jack-
son, writing for the plurality, suggested that children’s rights were at stake.183 
The parents challenged a state statute that compelled students to salute the 
American ºag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance.184 Jackson recognized 
that students’ interests in developing their religious and political identi-
ties were at stake in the case.185 
Jackson stated that the compelled salute and pledge violated consti-
tutional protections of free expression and free religious exercise and could 
not be justiªed by the state’s desire to assimilate children to a uniªed stan-
dard of nationalism.186 The children were vulnerable to adopting unortho-
dox values, but Jackson reasoned that the possibility of children adopting 
“eccentricity and abnormal attitudes” did not justify restricting the stu-
dents’ constitutional rights.187 This prioritization of identity interests over 
assimilation is consistent with the pluralism principle’s ªrst prong. Jack-
son also noted that students’ deviation from majoritarian standards of na-
tionalism did not threaten national security.188 If national security were 
threatened, the school’s policy would have been constitutional.189 That logic 
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 Id. at 640. 
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 Id. 
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comports with the pluralism principle’s second prong because a threat to 
national security would qualify as a cognizable harm. 
After Barnette planted the pluralism principle’s seed, the principle 
sprouted in the later cases of Tinker v. Des Moines,190 Island Trees Union 
Free School District v. Pico,191 and Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional.192 In Tinker, the Court upheld secondary students’ First Amendment 
right to protest the Vietnam War in school.193 The Court stated that, even 
though the protests exposed vulnerable children to controversy, that did 
not justify infringing students’ rights to express their political identity.194 
The Court stated that public schools may not censor students’ speech just 
because the speech is unpopular or unpleasant to the community.195 Put dif-
ferently, the Court again protected children’s ability to explore and to com-
mit to values associated with identities that are out of the mainstream. 
The Court did make two exceptions: public schools may restrict speech if 
it impinges upon the rights of other students to be free and let alone or if 
it is substantially disruptive.196 These exceptions comport with the plural-
ism principle’s second prong because they both prevent cognizable harms. 
Island Trees Union Free School District v. Pico, which dealt with the 
removal of controversial books from public school libraries,197 reinforced 
the pluralism principle. The school board argued that removing the books 
was necessary “to protect the children in our schools from . . . moral dan-
ger.”198 Writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan noted that schools do have 
an interest in inculcating children with values, but that interest alone cannot 
justify limiting children’s First Amendment rights.199 Justice Brennan’s opin-
ion held that “local school boards may not remove books from school 
library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those 
books and seek by their removal to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion.’”200 By remov-
ing controversial books, the school board delegitimized minority values 
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and goals that conºicted with majoritarian community values. Brennan 
suggested that the community’s desire to protect children from “moral dan-
ger” did not justify reducing children’s First Amendment rights.201 In Pico, 
the Court again protected children’s ability to explore minority identities, 
while reiterating that nonconformity is not in and of itself a “danger.” 
The privacy case of Carey v. Population Services International is also 
consistent with the pluralism principle. In Carey, the Court invalidated a 
New York statutory provision that banned the sale of contraceptives to mi-
nors under the age of sixteen, except when deemed appropriate by the mi-
nors’ physicians.202 New York contended that its law was “permissible as 
a regulation of the morality of minors in furtherance of the State’s policy 
against promiscuous sexual intercourse among the young.”203 
Although the Court did not say so explicitly, identity interests were 
at stake in Carey because the government was seeking to assimilate chil-
dren to the sexual mores of majoritarian identity groups. In addition, identity 
interests were at stake because intimate relationships can inform one’s sense 
of self.204 The plurality recognized that New York had a legitimate reason 
for limiting promiscuous sex among teenagers: the prevention of physical 
and psychological harms associated with adolescent intercourse, especially 
the physical and psychological harms that teenage motherhood imposes 
on the mother and child.205 The plurality did not believe that merely send-
ing a moral message to youth could credibly curb those physical and psy-
chological harms.206 Critically, however, sending a moral message was not in 
and of itself a legitimate reason for reducing minors’ rights.207 By invok-
ing physical and psychological harms as the only way the state could have 
justiªed its law, the plurality adhered to the pluralism principle’s second 
prong. The Court was not making a culturally subjective judgment regarding 
sexual mores, but was concerned about both the enduring consequences of 
teenage intercourse and the harms that such intercourse imposes on others, 
namely children resulting from the intercourse.208 
In Barnette, Tinker, Pico, and Carey, the Court did not analyze all 
three of the factors identiªed in Bellotti: vulnerability, maturity, and def-
erence to parents. In these cases, the Court focused on analyzing whether 
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children were vulnerable to harms. Those analyses were driven, at least im-
plicitly, by the pluralism principle. In each case, the state sought to limit 
children’s ability to explore or express values and goals associated with 
minority identities to protect children from straying from community norms. 
In each case, the Court stated that nonconformity is not inherently harm-
ful and then protected children’s identity interests by extending the con-
stitutional rights of adults to children. In these cases, the Court raised the 
pluralism principle to shield children from a rights reduction. 
b. Deconstructing Potential Challenges 
The Supreme Court case that potentially challenges the pluralism 
principle is Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,209 a subsequent case 
involving vulgar speech. The Court held that a high school did not violate 
the First Amendment by punishing a student who delivered a speech laced 
with gratuitous sexual references.210 In the speech, Matthew Fraser nomi-
nated a classmate for student ofªce while referring to the candidate in 
graphic sexual metaphors.211 Ultimately, as discussed below, Fraser does 
not challenge the pluralism principle because no identity interests were at 
stake. 
Some commentators and lower courts wrongly view Fraser as im-
plicitly overruling Tinker and granting schools broad discretion to censor 
the expression of any ideas that they deem offensive.212 In such cases, the 
pluralism principle is violated based on a misinterpretation of Fraser. Be-
fore reaching my analysis of Fraser, I consider one lower court example, 
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education.213 
In Boroff, the Sixth Circuit upheld a school’s prohibition of T-shirts 
featuring the musical performer Marilyn Manson.214 One T-shirt was criti-
cal of Christianity and another T-shirt had illustrations of Marilyn Man-
son “largely unadorned by text.”215 Citing Fraser, the court stated: “[t]he 
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Supreme Court has held that the school board has the authority to deter-
mine what manner of speech in the classroom or in school is appropri-
ate.”216 The court concluded that the rock artist “promotes disruptive and 
demoralizing values,” and the T-shirts “were determined to be vulgar, 
offensive, and contrary to the education mission of the school.”217 
Identity interests were at stake in Boroff. Commentators have noted 
that Marilyn Manson’s music has a value-laden agenda: to challenge the 
gender binary, to question mainstream American values, to champion indi-
viduality, and to have people take responsibility for their actions.218 Com-
mentators have also noted that Marilyn Manson’s values are consonant 
with queer identity.219 Because of the identity interests involved, the Boroff 
majority violated the pluralism principle. The principle protects chil-
dren’s identity interests: the ability to explore and express values and 
goals that shape their identities. Invoking community norms without point-
ing out cognizable harms as the Boroff court did is insufªcient justiªcation 
for infringing identity interests. 
The school administrators in Boroff were particularly troubled by the 
shirt that conveyed anti-Christian sentiments.220 The court would have ad-
hered to the pluralism principle had it reasoned that the anti-Christianity 
T-shirt amounted to hate speech, thereby harming other students.221 Simi-
larly, the court would have adhered to the pluralism principle had it rea-
soned that Marilyn Manson T-shirts incited students to harm themselves, 
for example by engaging in drug use.222 Instead of doing so, the court simply 
asserted that both T-shirts contravened school morals and thus were subject 
to regulation.223 
Contrary to the Boroff court’s interpretation, however, Fraser does 
not afford schools with broad discretion to assimilate children to community 
norms as the school did in Boroff. Correctly understood, Fraser sug-
gested that schools may censor “low-value”224 language but not offensive 
ideas.225 The Court described the language, not the ideas, in Fraser’s speech 
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as “obscene,” “vulgar,” “lewd,” and “offensively lewd.”226 In cases involv-
ing adult speakers and child speakers alike, the Court has repeatedly stated 
that such expression is not just offensive;227 it is of low value and thus 
subject to reduced First Amendment protection, if any at all.228 According 
to the Court, obscene and indecent expressions are low value because “such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of . . . 
slight social value as a step to truth.”229 
Unlike the gratuitous sexual remarks made by the student in Fraser, 
expressions of identity are anything but low value. Expressions of iden-
tity are expositions of ideas, although such expositions may be coded and 
implicit. Recall that identities are commitments to speciªc values and goals 
with regard to particular social categories.230 Thus, expressions of identi-
ties are expressions of ideas, endorsements of particular values and goals. 
The student who wears kente scarves to express her African American 
identity is endorsing values that she associates with African Americans. 
The student who wears a Marilyn Manson T-shirt to express her queer 
identity is also endorsing a particular set of values. 
Expression of one’s identity also is not low-value speech because 
expression of one’s identity is a form of self-realization. Jurists have touted 
the facilitation of self-realization as being one of the reasons why the Con-
stitution protects free speech.231 Expressions of identity are especially valu-
able for adolescents because realizing one’s sense of self is the primary 
psychosocial developmental task of adolescence.232 
Had Fraser argued that his use of sexual language was itself a sub-
stantive message (which he did not), his case would have posed a more difª-
cult question. He might have argued that his use of sexual language was a 
political statement against his school’s rule against sexual language. As 
an expression of political ideology, the student’s speech would not be of 
low value. Nonetheless, under the pluralism principle, the school still would 
have been able to intervene under the second prong, because treating rule 
breaking itself as protected speech would plant the seeds of anarchy. The 
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disorder that would ensue is a cognizable harm, as it would compromise 
other students’ interests in security and public education. 
Note that the government may regulate many areas of children’s ex-
pression, not just obscene and indecent speech, without implicating iden-
tity interests. The pluralism principle only protects children’s exercise of 
identity interests and not free expression generally. Therefore, a teacher 
can mandate that students raise their hands rather than randomly shout 
responses to the teacher’s questions; mandate silent reading time; deduct 
points for students’ poor grammar;233 and discipline cheaters by having them 
write “I will not cheat” one hundred times on the whiteboard. In each of 
these instances, children are unlikely to argue that restrictions on their 
expression undermine identity interests. Thus, the pluralism principle is 
not implicated. 
2. Preventing Cognizable Harms 
a. Binding Commitments as Harms to Self 
While the cases just discussed dealt primarily with the pluralism prin-
ciple’s ªrst prong, other cases reinforce the second prong, which dictates 
that the government can infringe identity interests to prevent the cogniza-
ble harms deªned in Part II.B. Consider Bellotti, in which the Court ad-
dressed whether pregnant teenagers should have the same constitutional 
right as pregnant adults to make reproductive decisions.234 The State of Mas-
sachusetts had a statute that required pregnant teenagers to procure either 
parental consent or a judicial bypass prior to undergoing an abortion.235 
The Court stated that a pregnant teen is entitled to a judicial bypass if, 
upon a hearing, a judge ªnds that the teen is “mature enough and well 
enough informed to make her abortion decision” or that “the desired abor-
tion would be in her best interests.”236 In so holding, the Court suggested 
that minors do not have the same reproductive rights as adults because 
minors who face decisions regarding abortion are vulnerable to cognizable 
harms. 
The law in Bellotti implicated identity interests by precluding many 
teenage women from making reproductive choices based on their own reli-
 
                                                                                                                             
233
 One might argue that requiring students to use “standard” English in assignments is 
an assimilation demand on, for example, Ebonics speakers. Drawing from the writings of 
Lisa Delpit, I believe that requiring students to learn standard English is not a coercive assimi-
lation demand, as long as teachers do not denigrate Ebonics as inherently “wrong” or 
“deªcient.” Teachers can simultaneously afªrm the cultural worth of Ebonics and require 
students to learn standard English because of its practical value. See Lisa Delpit, What 
Should Teachers Do About Ebonics?, in Tongue Tied: The Lives of Multilingual 
Children in Public Education (Otto Santa Ana ed., 2004)). 
234
 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
235
 Id. at 625–26.  
236
 Id. at 643–44. 
356 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 42 
gious and moral sensibilities. The Bellotti decision required teenage women 
to assimilate to speciªc religious and cultural norms. While the Court noted 
that abortion decisions raise “profound moral and religious concerns,”237 
it emphasized that abortion is ultimately a medical decision with irreversible 
consequences.238 Reading Bellotti in light of the Court’s larger jurispru-
dence on children’s rights suggests that the morality and religious con-
cerns were aggravating but not dispositive factors.239 Rather, the Court seems 
to have been swayed by the long-term consequences involved in medical 
decisionmaking. By emphasizing the irreversible nature of abortions, the 
Court invoked the pluralism principle’s second prong. 
Because the Court determined that teenagers facing abortion deci-
sions are vulnerable to cognizable harms, the other two Bellotti factors—
deference to parents and maturity—came into play. The Court upheld the 
government’s deference to parents on whether their daughters should re-
ceive abortions, but maintained that daughters could trump that deference 
by proving to judges that they were mature.240 
Veronica School District v. Acton241 also supports the pluralism prin-
ciple’s second prong. In Acton, the Court upheld a school’s policy of ran-
domly testing student athletes for drug use.242 The Court upheld the tests, 
over a Fourth Amendment challenge, by invoking a compelling govern-
ment interest in preventing a cognizable harm: the long-term bodily con-
sequences of drug use.243 The Court invoked the harms of drug use to re-
duce children’s constitutional rights, emphasizing at length not only the 
harmful physical and psychological consequences of drugs generally,244 but 
also the enduring effects they have on children speciªcally.245 The case 
did not implicate identity interests. However, by emphasizing that drug use 
is harmful because it binds children to long-term bodily consequences, the 
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Court lent support to the deªnition of “cognizable harm” in the pluralism 
principle’s second prong. 
Interestingly, the Court emphasized that the tests only looked for drugs 
and not diabetes, epilepsy, teen pregnancy, or other stigmatized medical 
statuses.246 One element of the tests that did give the Court pause was the 
requirement that students give advance disclosure of prescription drug use, 
so as to avoid false positives.247 Interestingly, the Court only paused when 
children’s identity interests had the possibility of being unduly compro-
mised—when the school may have “outed” students as belonging to a 
potentially stigmatized identity group based on medical status.248 This atten-
tion to identity interests thus lends further support to the pluralism prin-
ciple’s ªrst prong. 
b. Harms to Others 
The ªnal type of equal rights cases arises when a government’s ef-
forts to protect children’s identity interests are trumped by its efforts to 
prevent harms to others. Tinker, discussed above, made room for govern-
ment intervention in these cases. Tinker held that students have freedom 
of expression in schools, but that schools may limit that freedom when a 
student’s expression substantially disrupts class or when a student’s ex-
pression impinges upon the rights of others to be free and let alone.249 The 
ªrst exception speciªcally prevents students from violating other stu-
dents’ interests in public education and in an educational environment free 
of physical disturbance.250 The second exception is a broad provision that 
protects others’ interests more generally.251 
Another case on student expression, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhl-
meier,252 can also be read to support the pluralism principle’s second prong. 
Kuhlmeier leaves room for interpretation that affects its relationship to 
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the pluralism principle. At best, Kuhlmeier lends full support to the plu-
ralism principle; at worst, Kuhlmeier stands for the proposition that, when 
the line between student speech and the school’s own speech is blurred, 
the school may deªne cognizable harms more capaciously than the plu-
ralism principle does. 
In Kuhlmeier, students challenged censorship of two articles in a stu-
dent newspaper.253 At the outset, the Court distinguished Kuhlmeier from 
Tinker. The Court reasoned that children have reduced First Amendment 
rights when they are speaking through a school-sponsored newspaper be-
cause the newspaper bears the school’s imprimatur.254 In Tinker, the stu-
dent protest happened to be on school grounds, but the school did not spon-
sor the protest.255 Because a school-sponsored newspaper bears the school’s 
imprimatur, people may reasonably attribute opinions in the newspaper to 
the school, blurring the line between the speech of the student and that of 
the school.256 As a result of this blurring, the Court declared that schools 
may censor school-sponsored speech “so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”257 
The holding in Kuhlmeier required the determination of what consti-
tutes a legitimate pedagogical concern. The Kuhlmeier Court held that the 
ªrst article, which addressed the impact of divorce on students, was cen-
sored for legitimate pedagogical reasons.258 The school refused to publish 
the article partly because its author’s inadequate research did not satisfy 
journalistic standards.259 Indeed, requiring thorough and unbiased re-
search, proper spelling, correct grammar, and the like seems to be directly 
related to pedagogy. Here, the difference between pure student speech and 
school-sponsored speech becomes clear: a school can refuse to publish an 
article in the school newspaper because of poor grammar or poor research, 
but it cannot ban an antiwar protest that happens to be on school grounds 
just because the protesters are speaking with poor grammar and making 
poorly researched arguments. 
In addition, the school was concerned that the article on divorce com-
promised the privacy of some parents.260 The school was concerned that 
the second article also threatened privacy interests. The second article, 
which addressed student pregnancies, did not adequately protect the ano-
 
                                                                                                                             
253
 Id. at 260. 
254
 See id. at 270–71. 
255
 See id. 
256
 See id. 
257
 Id. at 273. 
258
 See id. at 273–75. 
259
 The author of the article failed to interview a divorcée whom the author sharply 
criticized. See id. at 274–75. A professional newspaper editor and a former college journal-
ism instructor both testiªed that the author’s reporting did not meet journalistic standards. 
See id. at 275 n.8. 
260
 See id. at 263, 275. 
2007] Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights 359 
nymity of the students interviewed for the piece.261 Thus, the school prin-
cipal feared that the article would jeopardize the privacy interests of the 
students interviewed, their boyfriends, and their families.262 Protecting those 
individuals’ privacy interests constituted a legitimate pedagogical goal.263 
In fact, most of the Court’s analysis was devoted to discussing this peda-
gogical goal of preventing harm to others’ privacy.264 
As analyzed thus far, the school’s refusal to publish the two articles 
supports the pluralism principle. The censorship was not based on a desire to 
limit the underlying ideas. The censorship was motivated in part by the 
school’s desire to prevent cognizable harms to others, in this case, threats 
to others’ privacy. Insofar as poor research justiªed censorship, the cen-
sorship did not delegitimize the author’s opinion, which may have been 
central to her identity. Censoring for poor research does not undermine iden-
tity interests. 
A small component of the Kuhlmeier opinion may, however, conºict 
with the pluralism principle. In addition to discussing the pedagogical con-
cerns already listed, the Court mentioned that the school was reasonable 
in its concern that the pregnancy article’s discussion of sexual activity and 
birth control might be “inappropriate” for the school’s freshmen and for the 
“even younger brothers and sisters” of students who may bring the school 
newspaper home.265 It is unclear whether that concern was purely a moral 
concern, which would not amount to a cognizable harm under the pluralism 
principle, or rather was a concern that the article might encourage younger 
students and siblings, who may not be adequately informed about sex, to 
explore potentially irresponsible or dangerous sexual activity. The latter 
concern would amount to a cognizable harm under the pluralism principle. 
By emphasizing the article’s impact on younger students, the Court 
seemed to imply that the school was concerned about something more than 
mere moralism. The Court could have said that instilling a sense of mo-
rality was itself a legitimate pedagogical concern. Instead, it said that the 
article’s impact on younger children was a legitimate concern. The age-
speciªc nature of the Court’s reasoning suggests that there was concern 
about more than just a moral harm. 
C. The Principle and Children’s Special Rights 
The cases cited above concerning whether children should have the 
same rights as adults constitute the majority of the Court’s children’s rights 
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cases. However, in a small but growing number of cases, the Court has con-
sidered whether children should have greater constitutionally protected 
negative liberties than adults and has answered in the afªrmative. 
In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court noted that children’s rights cannot be 
equated with those of adults.266 When children’s rights are not equal to those 
of adults, however, they need not be less. Bellotti reminds us that courts 
must apply constitutional principles “with sensitivity” to “children’s vul-
nerability and their needs for concern, sympathy, and paternal attention.”267 
That sensitivity may require courts to grant children greater, not lesser, 
negative liberties, which have been referred to as children’s special rights.268 
Speciªcally, courts should be sensitive to children’s vulnerability to the 
identity-related harms discussed in Part I. 
Properly understood, Brown v. Board of Education269 was the ªrst case 
on children’s special constitutional rights. In Brown, the Court explained 
that segregated schools inºicted identity-related harms speciªcally on chil-
dren,270 even if segregated schools were equal by tangible measures such 
as physical facilities.271 Segregating children because of their race “gen-
erates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect [children’s] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”272 
The implied inferiority resulting from racial segregation hinders racial 
minorities’ identity development.273 The Court held that segregated schools 
were unconstitutional, even if the schools were equal by tangible terms.274 
In Brown, the Court emphasized that segregation was particularly 
harmful to children.275 Accordingly, its explicit holding only spoke to the 
 
                                                                                                                             
266
 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). 
267
 Id. at 633–36. 
268
 See supra note 168. 
269
 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
270
 I should note that many commentators have criticized Brown’s use of social science 
literature to discuss developmental harms for being crude and problematic. See, e.g., Gar-
rick B. Pursley, Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race: Toward a Transformative Concept of 
Diversity in Higher Education, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 153, 154 n.8 (2003) (noting that this aspect 
of Brown “has generated an entire body of scholarship critical of such an approach”). These 
criticisms should not lead jurists to ignore insights from social science; rather, they should 
prompt greater interdisciplinary dialogue in order to improve the way jurists draw from 
social science. See Anne C. Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 431, 445–54 
(2006) (supporting the Court’s more recent steps to integrate psychology “into constitu-
tional decisionmaking”); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
997, 1005–08 (2006) (providing an example of an appropriate way in which the courts can 
utilize social science theories within their jurisprudence); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board 
of Education, Footnote Eleven, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 279, 307–18 
(2005) (showing that Brown has fueled greater multidisciplinarity in court decisions and 
legal scholarship). 
271
 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493–94. 
272
 Id. at 494. 
273
 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between 
racial stigma and sense of self). 
274
 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.  
275
 Id. at 494 (noting that criticisms of racial segregation “apply with added force to 
2007] Pluralism: A Principle for Children’s Rights 361 
context of public schools, that is, the context of children.276 Today, Brown 
is rarely thought of as a case of children’s special rights because legisla-
tors and the Court have rightly extended Brown’s holding against racial 
segregation to adult contexts such as public transportation and other pub-
lic accommodations.277 When Brown was decided, however, it granted spe-
cial rights to children because its explicit holding was so narrow.278 
Surely, Brown was not about assimilation demands; it concerned quite 
the opposite. Nonetheless, the Court implicitly invoked identity interests 
to justify special rights for children. Reframed with regard to the pluralism 
principle, the Court determined that the state could not justify its sociali-
zation policy of segregated schools, because children’s identity develop-
ment was at risk and the state did not invoke any cognizable harm. 
A second case worth mentioning is Roper v. Simmons, in which the 
Court held that children have a categorical right under the Eighth Amend-
ment to be free from the death penalty, even though adults do not.279 The 
pluralism principle does not apply to Roper because identity interests were 
not at stake; however, I highlight Roper because it created special rights 
for children and the Roper majority acknowledged that children’s vulner-
abilities led to that outcome. Children’s “vulnerability and comparative lack 
of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater 
claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative inºuences 
in their whole environment.”280 
As Emily Buss put it, courts should sometimes extend heightened 
constitutional protections to children in order to “maintain[ ] ªdelity to the 
principles animating constitutional rights.”281 Together, Brown and Roper 
show that, after examining children’s particular vulnerabilities, the Court 
has indeed extended special rights to children in order to satisfy constitu-
tional principles.282 Similarly, to the extent that constitutional provisions 
are meant to protect identity interests, they may necessitate special rights 
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for children because children are particularly vulnerable to threats against 
their identity development. 
IV. Applying the Pluralism Principle: A Case Study on Gay and 
Lesbian Youth 
As discussed in Part III, the pluralism principle already seems to 
drive the Supreme Court’s existing children’s rights jurisprudence. The Su-
preme Court and lower courts should explicitly recognize and implement 
the pluralism principle in future disputes regarding children’s constitu-
tional rights. The rights of gay and lesbian youth provide fertile ground 
for a case study on the pluralism principle’s applicability to future dis-
putes. 
The rights of gay and lesbian youth have become a highly contested 
area of law. In the past year, nineteen state legislatures considered bills 
that proposed either expanding or limiting the rights of gay and lesbian 
youth in public schools.283 Similarly, numerous courts across the country 
are wrestling with how to deªne the rights of gay and lesbian students.284 
Deliberations in legislatures and courthouses have produced inconsistent 
results. 
In this Part, I discuss how courts should decide the constitutionality 
of state policies affecting the identity development and expression of gay 
and lesbian youth. The sketches in this Part are drawn in broad strokes be-
cause particular cases are highly fact speciªc. Nonetheless, these sketches 
illustrate how the pluralism principle should guide judicial analysis. 
First, I discuss school policies that restrict students from joining 
noncurricular student groups that promote gay pride. I then address school 
policies that protect gay and lesbian youth from hate speech. Finally, I 
discuss the pending case of C.N. v. Wolf,285 in which a high school suspended 
a lesbian student and outed her to her family because she hugged, kissed, 
and held hands with her girlfriend on school grounds. 
A. Free Expression 
Student expression related to sexual orientation has become a con-
tentious issue. Most of the debate has focused on the rights of secondary 
students to participate in gay-straight alliances (“GSAs”), which are non-
curricular student organizations dedicated to combating homophobia and 
fostering welcoming school environments for gays and lesbians.286 Like 
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other membership organizations, GSAs are expressive associations.287 For 
many gay and lesbian youth, joining a GSA is an expression of gay pride. 
For many other students, joining a GSA is an expression of support for the 
gay community. 
Most GSA-related litigation has involved the Equal Access Act 
(“EAA”), a federal nondiscrimination law governing noncurricular stu-
dent organizations.288 Based on the EAA, courts have held fairly consis-
tently that, if a school allows any noncurricular student group to operate 
on school grounds, it may not bar students from forming GSAs.289 In light 
of these developments, some policymakers now seek to limit students’ 
access to GSAs by requiring students to obtain parental consent before par-
ticipating.290 These policymakers are writing new laws to require parental 
consent for participation in any noncurricular student group, so that there 
is no disparate treatment between GSAs and other student groups.291 
In August 2006, Georgia became the ªrst state to pass a statewide pa-
rental consent bill, which the governor signed into law.292 According to 
Georgia’s law, parents do not need to sign a new consent form every time 
their child joins a noncurricular organization; consent is assumed.293 How-
ever, parents may opt out and withdraw consent in writing for speciªc 
clubs.294 
As both a normative and legal matter, students in Georgia should be 
able to raise the pluralism principle as a shield, defending themselves 
against the rights reduction that the Georgia statute embodies. The prin-
ciple protects students’ ability to develop and express their identities. Iden-
tity development requires exploring goals and values associated with dif-
ferent social categories; participating in student organizations is one way 
to explore such identity-forming goals and values. As discussed above, 
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joining student organizations is also a form of expression. Parental con-
sent is an unjustiªed hurdle that blocks students’ exercise of identity in-
terests. There is no categorical harm to joining student organizations, and 
thus a categorical rule burdening children’s access to student organizations 
is unjustiªed. 
Based on the psychological literature discussed above, it is desirable 
for schools to provide students with a safe space to explore their identities 
without ªrst having to obtain parental permission. As James Marcia pointed 
out, adolescents who simply adopt their parents’ values and goals without 
exploring alternatives often fail to develop stable, mature identities.295 
That is not to say that parental guidance is not an important part of chil-
dren’s identity development; it is simply not the only part. The pluralism 
principle balances parents’ inºuences at home with a degree of freedom 
for adolescents to explore their identities in the public sphere, including 
in their schools. 
As a legal matter, consent requirements like Georgia’s do not run 
afoul of the EAA, but they do violate students’ First Amendment rights. 
Some might argue, problematically, that there is no Supreme Court case 
law that is directly on point. Kuhlmeier does not apply because noncur-
ricular student groups, unlike school-sponsored newspapers, constitute pub-
lic forums.296 Fraser also does not apply because noncurricular student 
groups do not categorically involve low-value obscene or indecent speech.297 
However, Tinker does provide some guidance. 
Advocates of the Georgia law might argue that Tinker can be distin-
guished because the school in Tinker barred speech entirely, rather than 
requiring parental consent.298 Indeed, advocates of the Georgia statute have 
noted that deference to parents has traditionally played a part in Ameri-
can law.299 Moreover, Bellotti identiªed deference to parents as one of the 
factors in its three-factor test.300 
With that said, the notion that Tinker does not control is ºawed and 
Georgia’s parental consent law should be found unconstitutional. Typi-
cally, the Court has limited children’s rights by deferring to parents only 
after ªnding that children were vulnerable to harms, as was the case in Bel-
lotti.301 In the past, the Court’s analysis of whether children are vulner-
able to harm has comported with the pluralism principle. That is to say, the 
Court has rejected suggestions that nonconformity with the mainstream is 
intrinsically harmful and instead has protected children’s ability to ex-
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plore and express unpopular and unorthodox identities. The Court has only 
reduced children’s rights upon a ªnding of the cognizable harms narrowly 
deªned in Part II.C. Accordingly, Georgia’s categorical requirement of 
parental consent is unconstitutional. Certainly, parents may wish to forbid 
their children from participating in after-school programs. They are free 
to take it upon themselves to withdraw their children from the programs. 
However, as discussed above, the state is not allowed to pass any laws to 
facilitate such parental wishes.302 
B. Hate Speech 
Another area of unsettled law involves hate speech in childhood con-
texts. First Amendment jurisprudence protects adults’ right to espouse 
hate speech.303 However, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether 
hate speech spoken by children to other children should be protected. As 
described below, lower courts have reached divergent conclusions. Under 
the pluralism principle, hate speech among children should not be protected 
because, even though the speech may further the speaker’s sense of iden-
tity, it does so at the expense of her target’s identity interests. Hate speech 
creates a cognizable harm by undermining other students’ identity devel-
opment.304 In cases involving hate speech in schools, the state legitimately 
can require child speakers to put down the shield of the pluralism principle, 
because doing so prevents harms to others. 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that this Article only legitimizes 
regulation of children’s hate speech in school contexts where children can 
harm other children. Children’s constitutional rights have never been co-
extensive with those of adults. Accordingly, adults can have a right to es-
pouse hate speech while children do not have a similar right.305 
In Harper v. Poway Uniªed School District, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Poway High School did not violate a student’s First Amendment rights 
when it stopped the student from publicly condemning homosexuality.306 
The school required the student to refrain from wearing T-shirts that 
amounted to “verbal assaults” against gay and lesbian students.307 One T-
shirt bore the slogans, “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CON-
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DEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.”308 The second 
T-shirt bore the slogans, “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL HAS EM-
BRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” and “HOMOSEXUALITY 
IS SHAMEFUL.”309 The student wore these shirts in response to his high 
school’s “Day of Silence,” which was intended to “teach tolerance of others, 
particularly those of a different sexual orientation.”310 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the student’s freedom of expression could be limited because his 
expression infringed the rights of other students “to be secure and let alone” 
and, thus, became unprotected speech under Tinker.311 
Courts in other federal circuits have reached opposite conclusions in 
similar cases. Most directly oppositional is Nixon v. Northern Local School 
District Board of Education,312 in which a high school disciplined a stu-
dent for wearing a T-shirt bearing the slogans, “Homosexuality is a sin!,” 
“Islam is a lie!,” and “Abortion is murder!”313 The district court held that 
the school violated the First Amendment because the student’s T-shirt did 
not collide with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let 
alone.314 
In another case, Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, a district court 
held that a school violated the First Amendment when it barred speakers 
from condemning homosexuality on a Diversity Week panel discussion.315 
Because the panel was a school-sponsored event, the court analyzed the 
case under Kuhlmeier instead of under Tinker.316 In other words, the court 
held that the school could limit student speech if it was “reasonably re-
lated to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”317 The court acknowledged that 
“to provide a safe and supportive environment for gay and lesbian students” 
was a legitimate pedagogical goal.318 However, the court determined that 
the school’s actions were not reasonably related to that goal.319 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Harper comports with the pluralism 
principle, while the latter two cases do not. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
made history; it was the ªrst reported opinion to restrict student speech 
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by relying on Tinker’s rights-of-others exception.320 The fact that the Ninth 
Circuit was trailblazing does not mean that its decision was wrong. 
The Supreme Court has not explicitly elaborated what it means to in-
terfere with the rights of other students “to be secure and to be let alone.” 
To discern a meaning for those rights, jurists must look at children’s rights 
jurisprudence generally, which I have demonstrated is guided by the plu-
ralism principle.321 As discussed above, assimilation demands inºict psy-
chological wounds,322 and hate speech is an assimilation demand because 
it sends the message that an individual will be despised and denied re-
spect unless she abandons or changes her identity.323 The Ninth Circuit was 
correct to conclude that students’ right “to be free and to be let alone” in-
cludes a right to develop their identity free of psychological attacks in the 
form of assimilation demands.324 This reasoning was used in Harper: “Being 
secure involves not only freedom from physical assaults but from psycho-
logical attacks that cause young people to question their self-worth and their 
rightful place in society.”325 
Giving schools the authority to protect students from hate speech grants 
them discretionary power, but that discretion is not atypical. Schools al-
ready have discretion when it comes to protecting children from other 
harms. For example, they have more leeway in determining what types of 
searches and seizures are “reasonable” in school contexts.326 Schools are 
also afforded considerable discretion in determining whether student speech 
would lead to substantial disruption that justiªes limiting student speech.327 
Hate speech regulations simply put identity-related wounds on par with 
physical wounds. Part I, which discussed the gravity of harm caused by 
assimilation demands, suggests that this parity makes sense, especially in 
childhood contexts. Children’s psychological wounds can lead to conse-
quences as grave as depression and suicide, wounds that may never heal. 
In contrast, a physical bruise, which schools already have discretion to 
prevent, might heal in a matter of weeks. 
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The district courts in Nixon and Hansen erred because they did not 
take affronts to identity interests seriously. They both offered perfunctory 
and conclusory assertions that the psychological harms of hate speech do 
not affect students’ security.328 Both courts seemed to imply that only physi-
cal security matters.329 However, such a determination would be at odds with 
both the pluralism principle and emerging patterns in Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. 
C. Equal Protection and Privacy 
Another current controversy is the pending case of high school stu-
dent Charlene Nguon, who has brought an equal protection claim against 
her high school for suspending her after she and her girlfriend held hands, 
hugged, and kissed on school grounds.330 According to Nguon, her school 
never punished opposite-sex couples for similar displays of affection.331 
In addition, Nguon claims that her school violated her constitutionally pro-
tected right to privacy by outing her to her parents without her consent.332 
If children’s rights were coextensive with adult’s rights, Nguon’s 
claims would be straightforward as a matter of law. In Romer v. Evans, the 
Supreme Court stated that animus towards gays and lesbians cannot be 
the rational basis for any government policy that treats gays and lesbians 
differently than straights.333 If Nguon’s school simply wanted to assimilate 
her to a heteronormative environment, that would amount to nothing more 
than mere animus toward gays and lesbians.334 However, since children’s 
rights and adult’s rights are not coextensive, the school may try to argue 
that it may reduce children’s rights to equal protection because it has an 
interest in instilling majoritarian community values at school.335 Reading 
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children’s rights jurisprudence in light of the pluralism principle suggests 
that the school should not prevail with this argument. 
The Court has only reduced children’s rights in cases where the state 
showed that children were vulnerable to harm.336 Comporting with the plu-
ralism principle, the Court has not viewed nonconformity as a cognizable 
harm.337 Moreover, the Court has protected children’s rights to explore 
various identities.338 Thus, Nguon’s school would have difªculty justifying 
its alleged disparate treatment by asserting that it sought to enforce students’ 
conformity to speciªc social values.339 
A more difªcult question is whether Nguon has a valid privacy claim. 
Her case would be easier if she had been entirely closeted, but she had al-
ready disclosed her sexual orientation at school. At least one lower court 
has held that the right to privacy includes a right not to be outed by state 
actors.340 However, in that case, there was no evidence that the outed party 
had ever disclosed his sexual orientation to anyone other than his appar-
ent sexual partner.341 
An adult who has disclosed her sexual orientation to as many people 
as Nguon had would likely have no valid privacy claim. The Supreme Court 
has recognized that individuals’ constitutional right to privacy includes 
“the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”342 It 
has also recognized that “the fact that ‘an event is not wholly private 
does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or 
dissemination of information.’”343 However, adults’ rights to privacy cease to 
exist once their “expectation of privacy” is no longer “reasonable.”344 Some 
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commentators believe that, as a general rule, once an individual is bold 
enough to display same-sex affection in public, it is unreasonable for that 
person to expect people not to disclose her sexual orientation to others.345 
But children should not be—and have not been—subject to the same general 
rules developed for adult contexts. 
The privacy rights of children should be distinguished from those of 
adults since a special right is sometimes necessary for childhood contexts.346 
To discern whether children require a different legal test, jurists must ask 
what principle is animating the right to privacy and whether furthering 
that principle in childhood contexts requires heightening children’s pri-
vacy rights.347 The common view among courts and commentators is that 
the principle of self-determination animates the right to privacy, speciªcally 
the right to informational privacy.348 Taking self-determination seriously 
requires affording individuals the ability to determine when to disclose sen-
sitive facts about themselves, facts that, upon disclosure, may inhibit in-
dividuals’ ability to develop themselves. As Daniel Solove has pointed out, 
“disclosure [of sensitive personal information] can prevent people from en-
gaging in activities that further their own self-development . . . . Disclo-
sure can inhibit people from associating with others, impinging upon free-
dom of association, and can also destroy anonymity, which is sometimes 
critical for the promotion of free expression.”349 
To maintain ªdelity to the notion of privacy rights, then, courts should 
extend special rights of privacy to children when it is necessary to protect 
their identity development.350 Youth are particularly vulnerable to the harms 
of assimilation demands. By disclosing one’s sexual orientation, an indi-
vidual becomes more susceptible to assimilation demands. For example, 
youth who are outed to their parents may receive added pressure from their 
parents to cease exploring their sexual identity. Indeed, courts have noted 
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that disclosure of information regarding one’s sexual identity can greatly 
alter one’s relationship with others, including one’s family.351 
Because children are uniquely vulnerable to the harms of being outed, 
there should be a categorical rule unique to children: the government should 
not out gay and lesbian youth unless the government shows that doing so 
prevents cognizable harms. For example, a public school might legitimately 
out a lesbian student to her parents if doing so was part of a plan to inter-
vene in the student’s imminent suicide attempt. The government should 
never assume that a child’s being out in one social context (school) means 
that the same child is out in another social context (home); such assump-
tions do not comport with research showing that youth are often out to 
friends but not to family.352 A special categorical rule for children would not 
be novel. In contexts such as capital punishment, the state already has ex-
tended special categorical protections to children.353 Moreover, special pri-
vacy rights for children comport with both the purpose of privacy rights 
and the pluralism principle. 
In terms of implementation, the categorical rule for children would 
be easier to administer than the privacy test for adults. The inquiry for 
adults’ informational privacy involves two difªcult questions: is the rele-
vant information sensitive enough to trigger privacy interests and, if so, 
has the adult relinquished her reasonable expectation of privacy by begin-
ning a process of disclosure? Under the categorical rule for children, the 
ªrst question is the only important one, except in rare cases where the 
state has an interest in preventing cognizable harms. 
One might contend that the categorical rule is nonetheless difªcult to 
implement because a school may need to disclose a student’s sexual ori-
entation to explain a rule infraction to parents. For example, if Charlene 
and her girlfriend violated a globally enforced rule against kissing (which 
did not implicate equal protection), how should the school explain the in-
fraction to Charlene’s parents? If the rule were generally against kissing, 
there would be no need to disclose information about Charlene’s partner’s 
sex,354 just as there would be no need to disclose the partner’s race or re-
ligion. Quite simply, there will rarely be a need to disclose sexual orienta-
tion. So long as a school rule does not hinge on sexual orientation, sexual 
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orientation does not need to be disclosed; meanwhile, any rule that hinges 
on sexual orientation would implicate equal protection. 
Conclusion 
Assimilation demands are harmful to everyone, but they are particu-
larly harmful to children. Therefore, the pluralism principle proposed in 
this Article carries normative weight on its own. The fact that Supreme 
Court jurisprudence supports the pluralism principle only furthers the prin-
ciple’s persuasiveness. 
The pluralism principle has been lurking right beneath the surface of 
the Court’s opinions on children’s rights. Going forward, courts should im-
plement the principle in a more self-aware, explicit, and systematic manner. 
This Article only applied the pluralism principle to current contro-
versies regarding the rights of gay and lesbian youth. The principle can 
also guide how courts address issues involving other social categories. For 
example, ethnic minority youth have unsuccessfully argued that schools’ 
grooming codes violated their First Amendment right to express ethnic 
identity.355 Others have argued unsuccessfully that students should be pro-
tected against hate speech targeting religious minorities.356 This Article 
aims to prompt policymakers, courts, and other commentators to recon-
sider the reasoning behind those cases and to approach similar cases in 
the future with the pluralism principle in mind. 
 
                                                                                                                             
355
 See New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1973) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to a school grooming code with a hair-length requirement that pro-
hibited Pawnee students from wearing traditional Native American hairstyles). 
356
 See, e.g., Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 971 (S.D. 
Ohio 2005) (holding that a school violated a student’s First Amendment rights by prohibit-
ing the student from wearing to school a T-shirt that denigrated homosexuality and Islam). 
